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UNCONSCIOUS BIAS AND THE LIMITS
OF DIRECTOR INDEPENDENCE
Antony Page*
Corporate directors make difficult decisions: How much should
we pay our CEO? Should we permit a lawsuit against a fellow direc-
tor? Should we sell the company? Directors are legally obligated to
decide in good faith based on the business merits of the issue rather
than extraneous considerations and influences. Naturally, some di-
rectors may have preferences, or even biases: Our CEO, my colleague
and friend, deserves a lot; The company should not sue my fellow
board member; We should not sell, because after all, I would like to
remain a board member. But the courts presume that independent di-
rectors either do not have these preferences or can make decisions
without being affected by them. Similarly, independent directors act-
ing in good faith are likely to believe that they are either unbiased or
have overcome their biases. Based on a synthesis of more than two
decades of social psychology research, this article argues that fre-
quently the courts' presumption and the directors' belief will be
wrong. First, directors are likely to have preferences, even though
they sometimes will not be consciously aware of them. Second, re-
gardless of directors' good faith, unconscious and, to a significant ex-
tent, uncontrollable cognitive processes will prevent the directors' de-
cisions from being unaffected by their preferences. Given this serious
flaw in the conception of independent directors' decision-making
ability, the Article briefly evaluates several legal and procedural solu-
tions, including heightened judicial scrutiny, expanded roles for other
decision makers, and changed decision-making processes.
Associate Professor and John S. Grimes Fellow, Indiana University School of Law-
Indianapolis. J.D., Stanford Law School; M.B.A., Simon Fraser University; B.Comm., McGill Univer-
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the wake of the high profile corporate collapses and scandals of
2001 and 2002, regulators focused on corporate governance and inde-
pendent directors in particular.' In general, companies were required or
encouraged to increase the percentage of independent directors on their
board and increase the use of independent directors on board commit-
tees.2 For example, the two largest U.S. stock exchanges, the New York
1. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950-2005: Of
Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1535-40 (2007).
2. See infra Part II.
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Stock Exchange and NASDAQ, introduced rules requiring that a major-
ity of a company's board of directors be "independent."3 In addition, the
exchanges required that three key committees-audit, nominations, and
compensation committees-be comprised entirely of independent direc-
tors.4
Congress, the SEC, and the stock exchanges, however, paid much
less attention to the definition of independence or how to determine
whether a director was, in fact, independent. Generally, directors are in-
dependent if neither they nor their close family members are employees
of the company or have a material financial relationship with the com-
pany (other than compensation from their board service).' In essence,
directors are Darwinian homo economicus, biased only by significant fi-
nancial incentives to themselves and their families.
This model is flawed, as directors may in some circumstances be sys-
tematically biased for many other reasons besides family and finance. It
will come as no surprise that people are also biased by group loyalties,
friendship, and nonpecuniary self-interest. These other potential sources
of bias are either ignored or minimized. For example, the Delaware Su-
preme Court concluded that "most" friendships were not of a sufficiently
"bias-producing nature" to negate a director's independence. 6  If the
courts recognize these biases, they typically assume that a director's good
faith efforts or competing interests, such as a director's reputational in-
terest, will prevent biased decision making.7 Indeed, such biases might
matter little if directors, acting in good faith, could identify and control
them.
Frequently, however, the director can neither identify nor control
biases. People appear to suffer from a subset of "bounded rationality,"
sometimes termed "bounded ethicality"-an inability to perceive our
3. See NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual § 303A.01-.02 (2004), available at http://www.nyse.
comlFrameset.html?nyseref=htttp://www.nyse.com/regulation/nyse/118250812422.htm&displyPage=/
lcm/lcm_section.html (hereinafter NYSE Listed Company Manual] (defining "independent director"
for purposes of listing on the NYSE); NASDAQ, Inc., Manual: Marketplace Rules § 4200(a)(15)
(2008), available at http://wallstreet.cch.com/NASDAQTools/Bookmark.asp?id=nasdaq-rule 4300&
manual=/nasdaq/main/nasdaq-equityrules/ [hereinafter NASDAQ Manual] (defining "independent
director" for NASDAQ listing purposes). The American Law Institute has likewise endorsed the ma-
jority independent director standard. AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 3A.01 (1994) ("The board of every large publicly held corpora-
tion.., should have a majority of directors who are free of any significant relationship ... with the
corporation's senior executives ... ").
4. See NYSE Listed Company Manual, supra note 3, § 303A.04-.07; NASDAQ Manual, supra
note 3, § 4350(c)(3)(A)-(B), (c)(4)(A), (d)(2). The NASDAQ also permits a company to select direc-
tor nominees and approve CEO compensation by a majority vote of independent directors. Id.
5. See infra Parts I.A & ll.B.
6. Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1050 (Del.
2004).
7. See infra notes 56-60 and accompanying text.
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own ethical limitations.8 Recent psychological research demonstrates
that people are often both unaware of their biases and, more impor-
tantly, how their biases affect their decision making. 9 What we decide
can depend greatly on what we want to decide, but an "illusion of objec-
tivity" prevents us from seeing the impact of our motivations.0 Ex ante
we think we can decide ethically, and ex post we think we have decided
ethically. What information we look for, how we evaluate what we find,
and how we remember it are all affected by our initial cognitions and
motivations.1
After analyzing this research and its implications for the decision
making of independent directors, this Article briefly evaluates potential
responses. First, judges could impose a more robust definition of inde-
pendence, as demonstrated by a Delaware trial court, or scrutinize deci-
sions more closely in conflict of interest situations. Second, a different
decision maker (such as an independent specialist or even the sharehold-
ers themselves) could be used in those situations-notably executive
compensation, derivative litigation, and takeovers-where conflicts of
interest between directors and shareholders are most likely. Third, dif-
ferent decision-making strategies could be used to reduce, if not entirely
eliminate, the impact of unconscious bias.12
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides a brief overview
of the current approach for determining a director's independence. Part
III examines why directors might be biased. It presents the uncontrover-
sial evidence that people will be biased in favor of themselves, their
friends, and their groups. These biases have often been referred to, and
recognized by the courts as, "structural bias."13 This Part goes beyond
conventional wisdom, however, with reference to a host of cognitive psy-
chological studies that demonstrate that sometimes these biases can be
unconscious. People may unknowingly favor themselves, their friends
and their groups. Part IV shows how these biases can result in biased de-
cision making, without the awareness or intent of the decision maker.
Unfortunately, even well-intentioned, principled directors acting in good
faith may not necessarily be capable of reaching an unbiased decision.
Unconscious processes can so affect the decision maker that they have a
"bias blind spot."14 Part V highlights possible responses.
8. Dolly Chugh et al., Bounded Ethicality as a Psychological Barrier to Recognizing Conflicts of
Interest, in CONFLICTS OF INTEREST: CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS IN BUSINESS, LAW, MEDICINE.
AND PUBLIC POLICY 74, 74-75 (Don A. Moore et al. eds, 2005) [hereinafter CONFLICTS OF INTEREST].
9. See infra Parts IV.B-D.
10. See infra notes 276-88 and accompanying text.
11. See infra Part IV.C.
12. The use of particular decision-making and deliberation strategies as a means to better fulfill a
board's duty of loyalty will be explored in a subsequent article, Process Matters: Directors, Decision-
Making, and the Duty of Loyalty.
13. See infra notes 55-61 and accompanying text.
14. Emily Pronin et al., The Bias Blind Spot: Perceptions of Bias in Self Versus Others, 28
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 369, 369 (2002).
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II. WHO IS AN INDEPENDENT DIRECTOR?
Publicly traded companies in the United States must comply with
three main sources of rules defining independent director status: stock
exchange listing requirements,15 federal requirements such as the Sar-
banes-Oxley Act, 6 and state corporate laws of which Delaware's are by
far the most important. 7 Many companies also maintain their own inter-
nal standards that define who will be considered an independent direc-
tor.18
An independent director is usually defined in the negative. Al-
though the specifics differ, an independent director is typically one who:
(a) is not an executive of the company, (b) does not directly or indirectly
conduct material business with the company or have a material financial
interest different from shareholders, and (c) does not have close family
members who fall within the first two categories. Directors are thus
viewed as homo economicus (biased by financial incentives) combined
with a form of Darwinism (biased in favor of close family).
A. Stock Exchanges and Federal Law
The New York Stock Exchange listing requirements explicitly iden-
tify five relationships that prevent a finding of independence. A director
is not independent if she (or a member of her immediate family) either
currently or in the preceding three years (a) is an employee, (b) has re-
ceived $120,000 or more from the company in a twelve-month period, (c)
is associated with the company's internal or external auditor, (d) is an
executive officer of another company that had officers of the first com-
pany on its compensation committee, or (e) is an executive officer of a
company that has had transactions exceeding $1 million or 2 percent of
its gross revenue with the director's company. 9 In addition, the board
must "affirmatively determine" and publicly disclose whether a director
has any "material relationship with the listed company (either directly or
as a partner, shareholder or officer of an organization that has a relation-
ship with the company). 20
The NASDAQ's approach is very similar. The NASDAQ rules list
seven prohibited categories that are similar to the NYSE's categories,
but with minor changes such as different dollar and percentage thresh-
15. See, e.g., NYSE Listed Company Manual, supra note 3; NASDAQ Manual, supra note 3.
16. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in sections of 11, 15,
18. 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
17. See, e.g., Lawrence A. Hamermesh, The Policy Foundations of Delaware Corporate Law, 106
COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 1749-50 (2006).
18. See, e.g., The Dow Chemical Co., Independent Director Standards, http://www.dow.com/
about/aboutdow/standards/index.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2008).
19. NYSE Listed Company Manual,supra note 3, § 303.02(b)(i)-(iv), (b)(v).
20. Id. at § 303A.02(a).
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olds.21 The stock exchanges' focus is thus on business or commercial re-
lationships and the potential resulting conflicts. The exchanges are far
less concerned with social or structural concerns.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires that all audit committee members
be independent.22 Independence requires that a director "not, other than
in his or her capacity as a member of the audit committee, the board of
directors, or any other board committee - (i) accept any consulting, advi-
sory, or other compensatory fee from the issuer; or (ii) be an affiliated
person of the issuer or any subsidiary thereof. ' 23 The Securities and Ex-
change Commission requires that a majority of the board of an invest-
ment company be independent, which is anyone who is not an "inter-
ested person. '24 An interested person includes the usual list of selected
employees and affiliates, immediate family members, and those with ma-
terial business or professional relationships.2 ' Again, the focus is on
business or commercial relationships.
Third parties have also attempted to define independence. The
American Law Institute recommends a similar definition, but further in-
cludes a catchall that a director who "is subject to a controlling influ-
ence" by an interested director is not independent if "that controlling in-
fluence could reasonably be expected to affect the director's or officer's
judgment... in a manner adverse to the corporation. '26 "Controlling in-
fluence" is undefined but does not include subtler influences. Institu-
tional Shareholder Services, the self-styled world's leading provider of
corporate governance services,27 has a somewhat narrower definition of
independence. Like the exchanges, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and the
SEC, however, the definition focuses on business and family relation-
ships.28
B. State Law: Delaware
Courts in Delaware, the preeminent U.S. jurisdiction for corporate
law, apply a nuanced case-by-case approach to the question of director
independence.29 Under Delaware law, directors are presumed independ-
21. See NASDAQ Manual, supra note 3, § 4200(a).
22. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 301, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in sections
of 11, 15, 18,28, and 29 U.S.C.).
23. 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(3)(B) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
24. See Role of Independent Directors of Investment Companies, Investment Company Act Re-
lease No. 33-7932, 17 C.F.R. §§ 239, 240,270,274 (2001).
25. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(19) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
26. AM. LAW INST., supra note 3, § 1.23(a)(4).
27. RiskMetrics Group, ISS Governance Services, http://issproxy.com/issgovernance.html (last
visited Nov. 12, 2008).
28. INST. S'HOLDER SERVS., ISS US CORPORATE GOVERNANCE POLICY 2007 UPDATES 5
(2006).
29. Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1049 (Del.
2004) ("Independence is a fact-specific determination made in the context of a particular case.").
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ent and disinterested until shown otherwise.3" The touchstone "[u]pon
which a director's independence must be measured is whether the direc-
tor's decision is based on the corporate merits of the subject before the
board, rather than extraneous considerations or influences."31 The key
question is "[i]ndependent from whom and independent for what pur-
pose?"32
Somewhat confusingly, the court divides the inquiry into two sepa-
rate questions: first, "whether the director is disinterested in the underly-
ing transaction"; and second, "even if disinterested, whether the director
is otherwise independent."33 Disinterest refers to financial benefits. A
director is not disinterested if she will "receive a personal financial bene-
fit from a transaction that is not equally shared by the stockholders."34
She is also not disinterested where a decision of the board "will have a
materially detrimental impact on a director, but not on the corporation
and the stockholders."35 This inquiry is normally fairly straightforward.
It applies most obviously in situations where a director is on both sides of
a transaction, such as when a director is attempting to do business with
the company.36
The second, generally more debatable, question is whether the di-
rector is otherwise independent, which refers to a director's state of
mind. To demonstrate that a director lacks the necessary independence,
30. Id.
31. Id. (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 816 (Del. 1984)); Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d
927, 934 (Del. 1993) (holding that the inquiry is "whether the board that would be addressing the de-
mand can impartially consider its merits without being influenced by improper considerations"); see
Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 257 (Del. 2000) (stating that a director must not be "incapable, due to
personal interest or domination and control, of objectively evaluating a demand" in order to be inde-
pendent). Other states agree with this definition of independence. See, e.g., Desaigoudar v. Meyer-
cord, 108 Cal. App. 4th 173, 190 (2003) (holding that the court must determine whether a director is
"in a position to base his decision on the merits of the issue rather than being governed by extraneous
considerations or influences").
32. Beam, 845 A.2d at 1050; see also Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 22 (Del. Ch. 2002) (stating
that an independent director may not "have a financial interest in the transaction or [be] dominated or
controlled by a materially interested director"). Other jurisdictions follow similar approaches. See,
e.g., Park River Owners Corp. v. Bangser Klein Rocca & Blum, L.L.P., 703 N.Y.S.2d 465, 466 (2000)
(defining a director's interest as "either self-interest in the transaction at issue or a loss of independ-
ence because a director with no direct interest in a transaction is controlled by a self-interested direc-
tor"); MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT § 8.60 (2008) (stating that a director is not independent if "he or a re-
lated person is a party to the transaction or has a beneficial financial interest in or is so closely linked
to the transaction and of such financial significance to the director or a related person that the interest
would be reasonably expected to exert an influence on the director's judgment if he were called upon
to vote on the transaction").
33. Beam, 845 A.2d at 1049; see Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812 (holding that to be disinterested,
"[d]irectors can neither appear on both sides of a transaction nor expect to derive any personal finan-
cial benefit from it in the sense of self-dealing, as opposed to a benefit which devolves upon the corpo-
ration or all stockholders generally").
34. Rales, 634 A.2d at 936 (citations omitted).
35. Id.
36. A management buyout is a common illustration of this type of conflict of interest. Manage-
ment is trying to buy the company, and naturally would prefer a lower price. For an example of man-
agement overreaching, see Dennis Berman & Henny Sender, Backstory of Kinder LBO Underscores
Web of Ethical Issues Such Deals Face, WALL ST. J, Sept. 29, 2006, at Cl, C4.
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a plaintiff must show that the "directors were dominated or otherwise
controlled by an individual or entity interested in the transaction,"37 or
put differently, that a director is not so "'beholden' to an interested di-
rector... that his or her 'discretion would be sterilized."'38 The standard
is based not on a "reasonable director," but rather on the "actual per-
son."3 9 And as the terms "dominated," "controlled," and "beholden"
suggest, the standard is very difficult to meet.4 °
Beam ex reL Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart pro-
vides a good illustration of the difficulty of showing that a director is not
independent under Delaware law.4 The plaintiff began a derivative ac-
tion against Martha Stewart, alleging that she had breached her fiduciary
duties in connection with an illegal sale of stock in an unrelated com-
pany. 2 In a derivative action the corporation must first be given the
chance to control the lawsuit, in a process known as demand, because it
is the company's cause of action. Demand, however, is excused as futile
if a majority of the board is not independent and disinterested, and thus
is unable to objectively consider it. 3
The plaintiff argued that two directors were not independent be-
cause they had longstanding personal relationships with Stewart.4 Fur-
thermore, the plaintiff argued that none of the directors were disinter-
ested, given that they might (a) face liability for inadequately monitoring
Stewart's activities, and (b) lose the emoluments of board services if re-
placed by Stewart who had that power as the controlling shareholder. 5
Although at the pre-answer stage of litigation all reasonable infer-
ences must be drawn in plaintiff's favor, the court rejected these argu-
ments. The court acknowledged that "[s]ome professional or personal
friendships, which may border on or even exceed familial loyalty and
closeness, may raise a reasonable doubt whether a director can appropri-
ately consider demand. This is particularly true when the allegations
raise serious questions of either civil or criminal liability of such a close
friend."46 The friendship, however, "must be of a bias-producing na-
37. Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180,189 (Del. 1988).
38. Beam, 845 A.2d at 1050 (quoting Rales, 634 A.2d at 936).
39. McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910,923 (Del. 2000).
40. Courts will sometimes shift away from a strictly subjective standard because they are unwill-
ing to prevent "regular folk," for whom directors' fees would be material, from serving as independent
directors. See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 342, 360 (Del. Ch. 1998), rev'd on
other grounds, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000) (noting that "'regular folks' would face allegations of being
dominated by other board members, merely because of the relatively substantial compensation pro-
vided by the board membership compared to their outside salaries"); In re InfoUSA S'holders Litig.,
953 A.2d 963, 992 (Del. Ch. 2007) (same).
41. 845 A.2d 1040.
42. Id. at 1044.
43. For example, if a shareholder wants company A to sue company B, a director who serves on
both companies would have an obvious conflict. More commonly, a derivative suit seeks to sue the
company's board, which is clearly counter to the board's interest.
44. Id. at 1046.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1050.
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ture. ... 'Not all friendships, or even most of them, rise to this
level.... .""' Even though the trial court had found one of the relation-
ships a "close call,"48 the top court opined that "a much stronger relation-
ship" between Stewart and the directors would be necessary for the
plaintiff to prevail.49
The court also held that more than just a shareholder's control of a
corporation was needed to create a reasonable doubt of independence.0
Even though the directors were appointed by Stewart, and could be re-
moved by her at any time, this did not mean that they were beholden to
or dominated by her.5'
Moreover, although Beam concerned presuit demand, the opinion
reached out to discuss the special litigation committee (SLC) situation.
In situations where demand would be futile, the board frequently can
appoint an SLC composed of independent directors to determine
whether to litigate, settle, or terminate the court action. 2 An important
distinction is that whereas in the presuit demand context the plaintiff
bears the burden of proof, in the SLC context the committee bears it.
53
In addition, the plaintiff is not entitled to discovery on the issue of direc-
tor independence in presuit demand. The court pointedly refused, how-
ever, to decide whether there was any different substantive definition of
independence at these two stages of litigation. 4
To be fair, the court acknowledged that in some circumstances bias
could result from friendship or power.5 The court also understood that
"a director cannot be expected to exercise his or her independent busi-
ness judgment without being influenced by the ... personal conse-
quences resulting from the decision."5 6 More generally, Delaware courts
have occasionally acknowledged a "'structural bias' argument, which
presupposes that the professional and social relationships that naturally
47. Id. (citing cases where the courts found friendship too weak to create bias). Other courts
have expressly followed the Beam approach. See, e.g., In re Sonus Networks, Inc., 499 F.3d 47, 68 (1st
Cir. 2007) (stating that Beam's friendship standard is "demanding"); Connolly v. Gasmire, 257 S.W.3d
831, 847 (Tex. App. 2008) (noting that "friendship must be accompanied by substantially more" to
rebut a presumption of director independence for presuit demand purposes).
48. Beam, 845 A.2d at 1053-54.
49. Id. at 1052, 1054.
50. Id. at 1055.
51. Id. at 1056-57. In theory, plaintiff could prevail if the director's compensation were of "such
subjective material importance that its threatened loss might create a reason to question whether the
director is able to consider the corporate merits of the challenged transaction objectively." Telxon
Corp. v. Meyerson, 802 A.2d 257,264 (Del. 2002). But cf. Beam, 845 A.2d at 1050.
52. Committees are also used to negotiate and approve self-dealing transactions such as man-
agement buyouts.
53. The SLC must also demonstrate that it "acted in good faith" and "had reasonable bases for
[its] recommendations." In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 928 (Del. Ch. 2003).
54. Beam, 845 A.2d at 1055.
55. Id. at 1052.
56. Id. at 1049 (quoting Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927,936 (Del. 1993)).
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develop among members of a board impede independent decision mak-
ing. ,
57
The Delaware courts do not, however, allow plaintiffs to use struc-
tural bias as direct evidence of lack of independence or appear to ac-
knowledge the magnitude of personal consequences.58 In addition, direc-
tors' reputational interests will normally outweigh their professional and
social relationships. 9 A plaintiff must, generally without discovery, pro-
duce specific evidence that the independent "director would be more
willing to risk his or her reputation" than jeopardize his relationship with
the other party.' Direct evidence of lack of independence is hard to
come by, though many plaintiffs attempt to show that friendships among
directors compromise their independence. The Delaware Supreme
Court in Aronson recognized correctly that "[c]ritics will charge that we
are ignoring the structural bias common to corporate boards throughout
America, as well as the other unseen socialization processes cutting
against independent discussion and decisionmaking in the boardroom."61
C. Definitional Problems
Lawmakers and perhaps investors view independent directors as a
key part of the U.S. corporate governance system.62 The Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development states the conventional
view:
Independent board members can contribute significantly to the de-
cision making of the board. They can bring an objective view to the
evaluation of the performance of the board and management. In
addition, they can play an important role in areas where the inter-
ests of management, the company and its shareholders may diverge
such as executive remuneration, succession planning, changes of
57. Beam, 845 A.2d at 1050-51; see also Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 815 n.8 (Del. 1984);
Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 500 (Del. Ch. 2003); In re Pure Res. Inc. S'holders Litig., 808 A.2d
421, 444 (Del. Ch. 2002). In Zapata, a decision regarding an SLC's power, the Supreme Court noted
that "we must be mindful that directors are passing judgments on fellow directors.., who... [some-
times] designated them to serve both as directors and committee members." Zapata Corp. v.
Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 787 (Del. 1981). In Unocal, a takeover case, the court as justification for
invoking intermediate level scrutiny observed that there was a risk that directors might act solely or
primarily to keep themselves in office. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum, 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del.
1985).
58. Beam, 845 A.2d at 1051.
59. Id. at 1052.
60. ld. (stating that a plaintiff must show that "the non-interested director would be more willing
to risk his or her reputation than risk the relationship with the interested director").
61. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 815 n.8. The Delaware Supreme Court continued to acknowledge its
critics without taking action in Beam. See Beam, 845 A.2d at 1051.
62. See, e.g., Charles M. Elson. Enron and the Necessity of the Objective Proximate Monitor, 89
CORNELL L. REV. 496, 498 (2004) (arguing that board independence is a "critical component of mod-
ern governance theory").
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corporate control, take-over defences, large acquisitions and the
audit function.63
The underlying notion is that independent directors are more likely
to monitor management effectively because they have an objective view,
no conflicts of interest, and as a result, unbiased judgment. In economic
terms, they are thought to reduce the agency cost problem stemming
from the separation of economic ownership and control found in most
publicly traded companies.'
It is perhaps surprising then that researchers have not been able to
identify a clear-cut relationship between corporate performance and the
proportion of independent directors on the board,65 or serving on audit,
nominations, or compensation committees.66 Enron, Worldcom, and
many other prominent companies that collapsed had a majority of inde-
pendent directors on the board.67
Commentators have noted that independent directors may lead to
other problems. Limitations on independent directors' effectiveness in-
clude "constraints on time, information, and inclination."6 8 Independent
directors are likely to be less informed about the company and have less
incentive to perform well than inside directors.69 In addition, they may
reduce board cohesiveness by failing to be perceived as team players,7" or
by reducing trust within the board.71
63. OECD PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 64-65 (2004).
64. See generally ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 69-118 (1932).
65. There is an extensive, albeit largely inconclusive, literature addressing the relationship be-
tween corporate performance and independent directors. See generally Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard
Black, The Non-Correlation Between Board Independence and Long-Term Firm Performance, 27 J.
CORP. L. 231 (2002); Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Uncertain Relationship Between Board
Composition and Firm Performance, 54 Bus. LAW. 921 (1999); Dan R. Dalton et al., Meta-Analytic
Reviews of Board Composition, Leadership Structure, and Financial Performance, 19 STRATEGIC
MGMT. J. 269 (1998); Gordon, supra note 1, at 1500-08 (2007); Laura Lin, The Effectiveness of Outside
Directors as a Corporate Governance Mechanism: Theories and Evidence, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 898
(1996) (describing studies).
66. See April Klein, Firm Performance and Board Committee Structure, 41 J.L. & ECON. 275,275
(1998).
67. See, e.g., Elson, supra note 62, at 501 (observing that "most of [the Enron] directors would
have been considered independent under then-existing Securities and Exchange Commission or New
York Stock Exchange requirements"); Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corpo-
rate Fraud: A Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 26 (2002) (arguing that
"board independence has done little to prevent past mismanagement and fraud").
68. Ribstein, supra note 67, at 26 (summarizing MYLES MACE, DIRECTORS: MYTH AND
REALITY (1971)).
69. See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259,
1282 (1982); Stephen M. Bainbridge, A Critique of the NYSE's Director Independence Listing Stan-
dards, FEDERALIST SOC'Y FOR L. & PUB. POL'Y STUD. 22-23 (2002), available at http://www.fed-soc.
org/doclib/20070324_NYSEStandards.pdf.
70. See, e.g., Fischel, supra note 69, at 1283; Roberta S. Karmel, The Independent Corporate
Board: A Means to What End?, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 534, 550-51 (1984); Julian Velasco, Structural
Bias and the Need for Substantive Review, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 821, 860 (2004).
71. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and
the Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797, 812-13 (2001).
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The above criticisms appear well founded, but it is also likely that
the perceived benefit of independent directors-unbiased judgment-is
only sometimes achievable. As discussed above, director independence
continues to effectively mean financial independence for the director
(and close family members) from the corporation. As Professor Brudney
commented twenty-five years ago, "No definition of independence yet
offered precludes an independent director from being a social friend of,
or a member of the same clubs, associations, or charitable efforts as, the
persons whose compensation or self-dealing transaction he is asked to
assess." 2 The result is that a so-called independent director can pass
judgment on their friends, on people who will determine whether they
can stay a director or not, and on people who controlled past and will
control future rewards. Given the definition of independent, what are
some potential threats to an independent director's unbiased judgment?
III. BIASES AND MOTIVATIONS
Courts and academics have acknowledged that directors may be bi-
ased merely due to their role as members of a board of directors. Typi-
cally this has been referred to under the broad rubric of structural bias.73
Only occasionally, however, has either group acknowledged the potential
role of unconscious biases. The following three Sections explore how di-
rectors, "independent" or otherwise, may have personal interests, above
and beyond their financial and family interests, that conflict with their
professional obligation as directors. "As self-interested actors in a world
of limited goods and opportunities, we are motivated to promote and jus-
tify resource distributions that favor us and those to whom we are linked
by ties of kinship or group membership."74
The first two Sections summarize psychological research, primarily
from the last twenty years, that demonstrates the possibility of far more
pervasive and far deeper unconscious biases than has hitherto been rec-
ognized. Broadly speaking, these biases can be divided based on
whether they result from self-interest (broadly understood) or simply
72. Victor Brudney, The Independent Director-Heavenly City or Potemkin Village?, 95 HARV.
L. REV. 597, 613 (1982); see also Langevoort, supra note 71, at 801 (defining "an independent director
[as] one who actually takes the monitoring task ... seriously").
73. "Structural bias," defined as an "inherent prejudice against any derivative action resulting
from the composition and character of the board of directors," appears to have first been used by
Mark A. Underberg in Note, The Business Judgment Rule in Derivative Suits Against Directors, 65
CORNELL L. REV. 600, 601 n.14 (1980). Since then the term has been used for a "wide variety of fac-
tors ... includ[ing] the CEO's and other corporate insiders' practical control over nominating new di-
rectors and removing incumbents; business relationships that may exist between outside directors and
the corporation; the common cultural and professional background of many directors, and the fre-
quent social ties among them ..." Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Structural Bias, Special Litigation Commit-
tees, and the Vagaries of Director Independence, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1305, 1308 (2005) (citations omit-
ted); see also Velasco, supra note 70, at 855 (describing three structural bias paradigms).
74. Kristina A. Diekmann et al., Self-Interest and Fairness in Problems of Resource Allocation:
Allocators Versus Recipients, 72 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1061, 1061 (1997).
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from membership within a group. The third Section then evaluates an-
other set of motives that some have argued allow a director to overcome
self-interested and ingroup biases, whether conscious or otherwise. Such
motives include an individual's desire to be and appear competent and to
have a good reputation.
A. Ingroup Bias
Ingroup bias is the general "tendency to evaluate one's own groups
more positively in relation to other groups."75 Positive evaluations may
then result in preferential treatment.76 The bias can include behaviors,
attitudes, and cognition.7 Favoring can take many forms, but may in-
clude rating ingroup contributions more highly, or assigning greater fi-
nancial rewards. Though the notion of ingroup bias may be unsurprising
when applied to groups based on race or ethnicity, nationality, religious
belief, or even college alma mater, ingroup bias occurs even when the
groups are categorized on a trivial or random basis, like a coin toss, shar-
ing the same fingerprint type, birthday, or final digit of a social security
number.78 The bias is so fundamental that "a preference for one's in-
group may be as ordinary as a preference for one's own children."79
This basic idea, that people will favor their own group members, is
relatively uncontroversial. The notion of recommending a fraternity
brother for a job or a member of your church for law school admission is
commonplace. This type of ingroup bias is conscious and explicit. Fur-
thermore, on its face it would appear controllable-simply do not rec-
75. Michael Healy & Victoria Romero, Ingroup Bias and Self-Esteem: A Meta-Analysis, 4
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REv. 157, 157 (2000). Ingroup bias is also referred to as intergroup
bias. See Miles Hewstone et al., Intergroup Bias, 53 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 575, 576 (2002) ("Intergroup
bias refers generally to the systematic tendency to evaluate one's own membership group (the in-
group) or its members more favorably than a nonmembership group (the out-group) or its mem-
bers.").
76. See, e.g., Diekmann et al., supra note 74, at 1071-72 (finding that participants judged unequal
allocations that favored a member of their group to be "much fairer" than unequal allocations that
favored a member of a different group).
77. Hewstone et al., supra note 75, at 576.
78. Henri Tajfel was the first to document what has become known as the minimal group para-
digm. The original experiments are described in Henri Tajfel et al., Social Categorization and Inter-
group Behavior, 1 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 149,172-77 (1971), and Michael Billig & Henri Tajfel, Social
Categorization and Similarity in Intergroup Behavior, 3 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 27, 37-48 (1973). See
also Jerry M. Burger et al., What a Coincidence! The Effects of Incidental Similarity on Compliance, 30
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 35, 35 (2004) (finding that subjects were more likely to re-
spond positively to a stranger's request if they shared even a superficial match, such as shared names,
birthdays, or fingerprint types); John F. Finch & Robert B. Cialdini, Another Indirect Tactic of (Self-)
Image Management.: Boosting, 15 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 222, 228-30 (1989) (finding
that participants who were informed that they had the same birthday as Rasputin judged him more
positively); Henri Tajfel, Cognitive Aspects of Prejudice, 25 J. SOC. ISSUES 79, 83-86 (1969) (describing
perceptual effects of grouping). Burger and colleagues argue that these incidental similarities "most
likely result[] in ... a fleeting sense of liking between the participant and the requester." Burger et al.,
supra, at 41.
79. Laurie A. Rudman, Social Justice in Our Minds, Homes, and Society: The Nature, Causes,
and Consequences of Implicit Bias, 17 SOC. JUST. RES. 129,139 (2004).
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ommend the fraternity brother or church member.8" It becomes much
more complicated if the recommender believes the fraternity brother or
church member is most qualified. More interesting, however, is how
much ingroup bias is implicit.81 There is now some evidence from brain
scan studies that ingroup bias may result from different neural underpin-
82nings.
Automatic (e.g., implicit and unconscious) ingroup bias has now
been demonstrated in nearly one hundred studies.83 These studies have
looked at groups not only based on obvious categories such as race and
ethnicity,8 gender, 5 age, 86 and sexual orientation, 7 but also completely
arbitrary laboratory divisions." Although gender, race, and age have
been listed as "the big three" for grouping, "[f]eatures that signal a per-
son's social category membership represent a fourth kind of 'most fa-
vored information' that has privileged access to the mind. '89  In some
cases, ingroup bias appears only at the automatic level and not at a con-
scious level.'
80. This position is akin to Chief Justice Roberts's statement that "[t]he way to stop discrimina-
tion on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race." Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch.
v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738,2767 (2007) (plurality opinion).
81. For an example of implicit ingroup bias with real world consequences, see David M. Messick
& Max H. Bazerman, Ethical Leadership and the Psychology of Decision Making, 37 SLOAN MGMT.
REV. 9,16 (1996) (arguing that ingroup bias is likely a common cause of discriminatory lending).
82. See, e.g., Jason P. Mitchell et al., Dissociable Medial Prefrontal Contributions to Judgments of
Similar and Dissimilar Others, 50 NEURON 655,660 (2006).
83. Nilanjana Dasgupta, Implicit Ingroup Favoritism, Outgroup Favoritism, and Their Behavioral
Manifestations, 17 SOC. JUST. RES. 143,146 (2004); see also Brian Mullen et al., Ingroup Bias as a Func-
tion of Salience, Relevance, and Status: An Integration, 22 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 103, 117 (1992)
(summarizing the research examining ingroup bias). Sometimes favoring members of one's own group
takes the form of derogating the outgroup.
84. See generally John F. Dovidio et al., Contemporary Racial Bias: When Good People Do Bad
Things, in THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF GOOD AND EVIL 141 (Arthur G. Miller ed., 2004) (describing
unconscious racism and ingroup bias and summarizing previous research).
85. See, e.g., Jennifer A Richeson & Nalini Ambady, Who's in Charge? Effects of Situational
Roles on Automatic Gender Bias, 44 SEX ROLES 493 (2001).
86. See, e.g., Nilanjana Dasgupta & Anthony G. Greenwald, On the Malleability of Automatic
Attitudes: Combating Automatic Prejudice with Images of Admired and Disliked Individuals, 81 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 800, 800 (2001).
87. See, e.g., Melanie C. Steffens, Implicit and Explicit Attitudes Towards Lesbians and Gay Men,
49 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 39, 39-40 (2005).
88. See, e.g., Leslie Ashbum-Nardo et al., Implicit Associations as the Seeds of Intergroup Bias:
How Easily Do They Take Root?, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 789, 790 (2001); David De-
Steno et al., Prejudice from Thin Air: The Effect of Emotion on Automatic Intergroup Attitudes, 15
PSYCHOL. ScI. 319 (2004) (suggesting that some emotional states can lead to automatic bias toward
outgroups); Charles W. Perdue et al., Us and Them: Social Categorization and the Process of Inter-
group Bias, 59 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 475, 475 (1990) (demonstrating that social categori-
zation can occur unconsciously).
89. Daniel M. Wegner & John A. Bargh, Control and Automaticity in Social Life, in 1
HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 446,472 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 4th ed. 1998) (emphasis in
original).
90. Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Implicit Partisanship: Taking Sides for No Reason, 83 J.
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 367, 370, 377 (2002) (finding that participants who simply studied the
names of four other people for less than a minute began to group the four names to themselves and to
positive outcomes, without any conscious awareness that they were doing so); Rudman, supra note 79,
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In general, the stronger the group ties or similarities, the stronger
the bias,9 but groups based on as little as pleasant social or professional
contacts can also lead to biased decision making based on unconscious
cognitive, affective, and motivational processes.92 Repeated exposure to
people "tends to enhance their subjective value," and therefore also in-
creases the bias.93 This can occur, even when people have no conscious
awareness of exposure.94 Members of high status or high power groups95
generally have higher levels of automatic ingroup bias than members of
groups with lower status or power, as do more loyal members.96
at 136 (reporting that "people preferred the dominant group to the extent that it was culturally fa-
vored, but only at the automatic level").
91. For a recent example, see Stefan Sttirmer et al., Empathy-Motivated Helping: The Moderat-
ing Role of Group Membership, 32 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 943, 952 (2006), reporting
that, in the minimal group paradigm, group members were more likely to help other ingroup members
based on their perceived similarities. In general, it is likely that there is greater bias in collective-
oriented societies than individualistic-oriented societies, like the United States. See Steven J. Heine &
Darrin R. Lehman, The Cultural Construction of Self-Enhancement: An Examination of Group-
Serving Biases, 72 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1268, 1274 (1997). Nearly all of the studies cited
here were performed with U.S. participants. Therefore, cultural factors are unlikely to weaken the
conclusions.
92. Paul Thagard, The Moral Psychology of Conflicts of Interest: Insights from Affective Neuro-
science, 24 J. APPLIED PHIL. 367, 374-75 (2007).
93. Robyn M. Dawes, Behavioral Decision Making and Judgment, in 1 HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 89, at 497, 521; see also Eddie Harmon-Jones & John J.B. Allen, The Role of
Affect in the Mere Exposure Effect: Evidence from Psychophysiological and Individual Differences Ap-
proaches, 27 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 889, 889 (2001) (finding physical evidence based
on cheek muscle activity in favor of the exposure effect); Rudman, supra note 79, at 138 (stating that it
has become an "axiom that proximity leads to attraction"); Robert B. Zajonc & Hazel Markus, Affec-
tive and Cognitive Factors in Preferences, 9 J. CONSUMER RES. 123, 125 (1982) (referring to the expo-
sure effect as a "basic process in preference and attitude formation and change"); Robert B. Zajonc,
Attitudinal Effects of Mere Exposure, 9 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL., June 1968, at 1 (defining
the exposure of the individual effect as "mere repeated exposure to a stimulus is a sufficient condition
for the enhancement of his attitude toward it"). See generally Robert F. Bornstein, Exposure and Af-
fect: Overview and Meta-Analysis of Research, 1968-1987, 106 PSYCHOL. BULL. 265 (1989) (analyzing
208 studies and finding strong support for the exposure effect, including for social stimuli).
94. See Robert F. Bornstein et al., The Generalizability of Subliminal Mere Exposure Effects:
Influence of Stimuli Perceived Without Awareness on Social Behavior, 53 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 1070, 1074, 1077 (1987) (finding that "subliminal exposure to the image of a person would
increase positive affect toward that person" and concluding that subliminal effects likely have an im-
pact in real life interpersonal situations); William Raft Kunst-Wilson & R.B. Zajonc, Affective Dis-
crimination of Stimuli that Cannot Be Recognized, 207 Sa. 557, 557-58 (1980) (finding that people pre-
ferred polygons that experimenters had previously presented to them, even though they could not
recognize them); Piotr Winkielman et al., Subliminal Affective Priming Resists Attributional Interven-
tions, 11 COGNITION & EMOTION 433, 433 (1997) (finding reliable shifts in affect resulting from sub-
liminal primes).
95. See Rudman, supra note 79, at 136 (noting that this bias applies to a host of different status
variables, including one particularly relevant to a board of directors, socioeconomic status); Itesh
Sachdev & Richard Y. Bourhis, Power and Status Differential in Minority and Majority Group Rela-
tions, 21 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 1, 22 (1991); see also Marilynn B. Brewer & Rupert J. Brown, Inter-
group Relations, in 2 HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 89, at 554, 544-94 (reviewing
studies); Diekmann et al., supra note 74, at 1073 (finding that advantaged recipients were more likely
to rationalize benefits to members of their own group (and more likely to violate an equality norm)
than less advantaged recipients with respect to members of the less advantaged recipients' group).
96. See Guido Hertel & Norbert L. Kerr, Priming In-Group Favoritism: The Impact of Norma-
tive Scripts in the Minimal Group Paradigm, 37 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 316. 321, 322 (2001)
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The positive impact of ingroup membership can even result in the
impossible situation where each individual ingroup member is judged su-
perior to the ingroup average.97 "Nominal and symbolic affiliation with a
group is enough to lead people to strenuous advocacy on behalf of, and
selective partisan perception with respect to, the group."9 8
Directors, even those defined as independent, are members of the
board of directors and, so the theory goes, are likely to be biased in favor
of other directors. More than twenty years ago, Cox and Munsinger
noted in their seminal work, Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological Foun-
dations and Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion,99 how ingroup
bias in the context of a special litigation committee might lead to a deci-
sion to discontinue otherwise meritorious derivative litigation. They ob-
served that the selection process for director nominees and the likely
high value directors place on their membership on the board are factors
tending to lead to stronger ingroup biases.1" Director nominees will of-
ten be friends or have social connections with other board members,
thereby exacerbating biases."l ' Even newly appointed members of a spe-
cial litigation committee will meet and work with existing board mem-
bers, possibly resulting in favoritism toward the preexisting directors."2
They also summarize the then-existing homogeneity of U.S. boards
and explain how cultural and intellectual similarities intensify ingroup
bias." 3 (In the early 1980s, 93 percent of directors were college-educated
white males, who tended to be wealthy, Protestant, and Republican.)" °
(finding that when experimenters primed loyalty there were greater amounts of ingroup favoritism,
due to the "rather unconscious" application of social scripts).
97. See Yechiel Klar & Eilath E. Giladi, No One in My Group Can Be Below the Group's Aver-
age: A Robust Positivity Bias in Favor of Anonymous Peers, 73 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 885,
885 (1997) (finding that subjects judged nearly all anonymous members of an ingroup as superior to
the other ingroup members); Yechiel Klar et al., Nonunique Invulnerability: Singular Versus Distribu-
tional Probabilities and Unrealistic Optimism in Comparative Risk Judgments, 67 ORGANIZATIONAL
BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 229, 229 (1996) (finding that peers were judged less likely to
suffer future negative events than the average of the peer group); Yechiel Klar, Way Beyond Com-
pare: Nonselective Superiority and Inferiority Biases in Judging Randomly Assigned Group Members
Relative to Their Peers, 38 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 331, 331 (2002) (finding that members of
a small peer group systematically judged randomly selected members of the group as superior to the
group average and median on socially desirable traits such as intelligence and friendliness); see also
Eilath E. Giladi & Yechiel Klar, When Standards Are Wide of the Mark: Nonselective Superiority and
Inferiority Biases in Comparative Judgments of Objects and Concepts, 131 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC.
PSYCHOL. 538, 549-50 (2002) (finding that the foregoing superiority biases are likely cognitive and
motivational in origin).
9& See Don A. Moore & George Loewenstein, Self-Interest, Automaticity, and the Psychology of
Conflict of Interest, 17 SOC. JUST. RES. 189, 195 (2004) (citation omitted).
99. James D. Cox & Harry L. Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological Foundations and
Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion, 48 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83,88 (1985).
100. Id. at 98, 102.
101. See Langevoort, supra note 71, at 797 (noting that "[i]nvitations to the board are based heav-
ily on matters like compatibility and 'fit"').
102. See Cox & Munsinger, supra note 99, at 103-04.
103. Id. at 105-08.
104. Id. at 106. This was an improvement from the early 1960s, when fully 56 percent of directors
were graduates of a mere fifteen colleges. Id.
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Today directors still tend to have relatively strong ties and similarities, as
they tend to be fairly homogeneous.1"5 More generally, groups that are
essentially self-selecting will often have homogeneous attitudes, since
people naturally tend to form relationships with those who are similar."°
Overall, Cox and Munsinger conclude that "powerful psychological fac-
tors are at work within the boardroom, creating a cohesive, loyal, con-
forming ingroup that will support its members.., under low and high
levels of motivation and group values."i0 7
B. Self-Interest
It is uncontroversial that people are self-interested. People will
generally seek financial and social benefits for both themselves and close
family members. This suggests that in the business context, directors are
likely to prefer outcomes that serve their pecuniary and social needs.
Definitions of independence recognize this notion, but carve out finan-
cial and social rewards of serving on a board. °8
The courts have even recognized in one conflict of interest situation,
the takeover bid, that directors may be biased by the desire to keep their
jobs.10 9 Courts have failed, however, to recognize this same bias when
there is a controlling shareholder, who generally has unfettered discre-
tion regarding who shall serve on the board of directors.
Serving on a board of directors provides rewards. Obviously there
are financial rewards. Median annual compensation in 2006 for a direc-
tor serving at the one hundred largest NYSE listed companies was
105. A recent survey found that 71 percent of the directorships at the top one hundred companies
were held by white males. Minorities made up 15 percent of the directorships and women were 17
percent. See ALLIANCE FOR BOARD DIVERSITY, WOMEN AND MINORITIES ON FORTUNE 100 BOARDS
6 (2008), http://www.proutgroup.com/Resources/abdreportfinal2008.pdf. Another recent survey found
similar results among the directors of the top two hundred companies. JULIE HAMBROCK DAUM ET
AL., SPENCER STUART 2006 BOARD DIVERSITY REPORT (2006), http://www.spencerstuart.com/
research/articles/955/. Diversity likely declines as one includes smaller companies. See Carol Hy-
mowitz, In the U.S., What Will It Take to Create Diverse Boardrooms?, WALL ST. J., July 8, 2003, at B1
(reporting that minorities account for only 8.8 percent of directorships at the 1500 largest companies).
106. See David C. Matz & Wendy Wood, Cognitive Dissonance in Group: The Consequences of
Disagreement, 88 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 22, 35 (2005) ("[M]any aspects of group forma-
tion and interaction lead to attitudinal homogeneity among group members."); Richard L. Moreland,
The Formation of Small Groups, in 8 GROUP PROCESSES: REVIEW OF PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 80,81-103 (Clyde Hendrick ed., 1987).
107. Cox & Munsinger, supra note 99, at 99; see also LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY
WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 32 (2004)
(arguing that a board's norms "tend to foster board cohesion"). Bebchuk and Fried quote a director
who has served on several boards stating that "[i]t is hard to explain to a person who is not a director.
It is in many ways a club." Id.
108. See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 342, 356-60 (Del. Ch. 1998), rev'd
on other grounds, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000); NYSE Listed Company Manual, supra note 3, § 303A.02;
NASDAQ Manual, supra note 3, § 4200(a)(15).
109. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) (referring to the
"omnipresent specter that a board may be acting primarily in its own interests" when it defends
against a hostile takeover).
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$174,000,110 with those serving on committees earning somewhat more."'
Board membership itself requires only a part-time commitment, and
many directors serve on more than one board.1' 2 Notwithstanding the
high compensation, the vast majority of directors tend to be high-income,
high-net-worth individuals, so the actual marginal value of the extra in-
come may not be as high. On the other hand, studies suggest that a re-
ward's magnitude may not be as important as existence of the reward it-
self."3
Directors may also be rewarded by the company's CEO due to the
CEO's control over the company's resources. These resources may be
directed to the directors' company or the directors' favorite charity."4
For example, donations to directors' preferred charitable organizations
were noted as a factor that contributed to the failure of Enron's board. 1 5
CEOs or other senior executives may also reward directors through their
professional and social contacts or influence."6 Finally, a CEO can "use
his or her bully pulpit to support higher director compensation.""'
Social rewards, such as validation, may be even more important
than the pecuniary impact of board directorship. Serving as a director
may contribute to one's sense of self worth. The successful investor
Warren Buffett reports "what many big shots love is what I call elephant
bumping. I mean they like to go to the places where other elephants are,
because it reaffirms the fact that when they look around the room and
they see all these other elephants that they must be an elephant too, or
why would they be there?""
18
110. FREDERIC W. COOK & CO., INC., DIRECTOR COMPENSATION: NASDAQ 100 vs NYSE 100
(2005), http://www.fwcook.com/alert-letters/2005-directorscomp.pdf [hereinafter FREDERIC W.
COOK]. In 2002, mean director compensation at the two hundred largest U.S. companies was
$152,000, and $116,000 at the 1,000 largest companies. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 107, at 25.
Compensation can easily exceed $400,000. See, e.g., Occidental Petroleum Corp., Proxy Statement
(Mar. 22, 2007), http://sec.edgar-online.com/2007/03/22/0000797468-07-000029/Section3.asp.
111. FREDERIC W. COOK, supra note 110, at 6 (reporting median annual compensation of NYSE
100 compensation committee members at $177,817, audit committee members at $180,651, compensa-
tion committee chairs at $190,135, and audit committee chairs at $191,432).
112. BEBCHUK & FRIED. supra note 107, at 17; see JAY W. LORSCH & ELIZABETH M. MACIVER,
PAWNS OR POTENTATES: THE REALITY OF AMERICA'S CORPORATE BOARDS 24-25 (1989).
113. See, e.g., John Bishop, The Recognition and Reward of Employee Performance, 5 J. LAB.
ECON. S36, S51-52 (1997) (citing studies examining the effect of merit-based pay on employee produc-
tivity).
114. BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 107, at 27-28 (stating that "[i]t has been common practice for
companies to make charitable contributions to nonprofit organizations that employ or are headed by a
director"); see also Biondi v. Scrushy, 820 A.2d 1148, 1157 (Del. Ch. 2003) (noting that the company
had been generous to a foundation that was important to the challenged independent director).
115. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, THE
ROLE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS IN ENRON'S COLLAPSE, S. REP. NO. 107-70, at 55 (2002), avail-
able at http://fll.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/enron/senpsi7O8O2rpt.pdf [hereinafter
ENRON REPORT].
116. BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 107, at 27-28.
117. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Pay Without Performance: Overview of the Issues, 30 J.
CORP. L. 647,656 (2005).
118. JOHN C. COFFEE ET AL., KNIGHTS, RAIDERS, AND TARGETS: THE IMPACT OF THE HOSTILE
TAKEOVER 14 (1988) (quoting Warren Buffett).
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In addition to financial and social rewards, potential career rewards
exist for directors who are also executives, such as developing skills and
contacts."1 9 Through board service, "executives gain broader insight into
trends in finance, technology, marketing and other fields of interest to
their firm." 2°
Given the financial rewards and "highly valued personal nonpecu-
niary rewards derived from the director's selection and service , ' 12 a di-
rector can be expected to want to remain a director. Directors thus are
likely biased in favor of decisions that allow them to continue as direc-
tors, including decisions in favor of those people who determine future
board membership, such as a controlling shareholder or those directors
serving on nomination committees.122 Even when there is no threat to di-
rectors' continued board membership, social norms help ensure that they
remember those that nominated them. "The norm of reciprocation-the
rule that obliges us to repay others for what we have received from
them-is one of the strongest and most pervasive social forces in all hu-
man cultures."'23 Directors' decision making may thus be biased merely
from a sense of obligation based in gratitude.2 4
C. Self-Image and Social Perception
As many commentators have noted, directors are not solely moti-
vated by a desire to enrich themselves or their families or enhance a
group to which they belong. In addition to being self-interested, direc-
tors are motivated to maintain a desirable self-image and to be compe-
tent. There are many reasons to "do a good job," such as "a director's
sense of honor; her feelings of responsibility; her sense of obligation to
the firm and its shareholders; and, her desire to 'do the right thing."'125
Psychologists agree:
119. Directors report that they are persuaded to sit on boards more by these nonfinancial rewards
than by the financial compensation. See Lynne L. Dallas, Proposals for Reform of Corporate Boards
of Directors: The Dual Board and Board Ombudsperson, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 91,109 (1997).
120. Cox & Munsinger, supra note 99, at 95.
121. Id. at 107.
122. There is research demonstrating that even so-called independent nominating committees
often end up nominating candidates who are suggested or preferred by the incumbent CEO. See Mi-
chael Dorf, The Group Dynamics Theory of Executive Compensation, 28 CARDOZo L. REV. 2025, 2033
(2007); James D. Westphal & Edward J. Zajac, Who Shall Govern? CEO/Board Power, Demographic
Similarity, and New Director Selection, 40 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 60 (1995) (showing that CEOs generally
control director selection).
123. Robert B. Cialdini & Noah J. Goldstein, Social Influence: Compliance and Conformity, 55
ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 591, 599, 604 (2004) (noting that gifts are often reciprocated, even when they are
unwanted by the participant).
124. BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 107, at 31 (citing Brian G. Main et al., The CEO, the Board of
Directors and Executive Compensation: Economic & Psychological Perspectives, 4 INDUS. & CORP.
CHANGE 293 (1995)) (arguing that directors may not bargain hard over compensation with a CEO
who brought them onto the board).
125. Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1052 n.32
(Del. 2004) (quoting Lynn A. Stout, On the Proper Motives of Corporate Directors (or, Why You
Don't Want to Invite Homo Economicus to Join Your Board), 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 8-9 (2003)); see
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[A]s social and socialized beings, we want to be perceived by our
peers (and to perceive ourselves) as fair and even handed. Indeed,
most of us want to see ourselves, and be seen by others, not only as
fair but also as generous, or at least less self-serving than other ac-
tors would be in similar circumstances.
1 26
Courts and academics have both dismissed, or at least minimized,
the dangers of structural bias on these grounds. For example, the Dela-
ware Supreme Court has noted in support of its position that an outside
director often depends on maintaining a good reputation, and would
therefore be unlikely to jeopardize that reputation with a biased decision
based on social ties.127  Accordingly, a plaintiff must show that "the non-
interested director would be more willing to risk his or her reputation
than risk the relationship with the interested director. '12 8 Fama and Jen-
sen have similarly noted the importance of a director's reputation for fu-
ture employment and thus as a mechanism to reduce biased decision
making.
129
In passing, in many if not most potential conflict of interest situa-
tions, it seems likely that the group or self-interested decision is not one
that carries any reputational risk. Remember, "the relevant reputation
for directors is the one among their peers, who face the same issues and
are likely to be quite sympathetic.""13 Foreclosing a derivative suit or ac-
quiescing in executive salary raises is unlikely to raise any eyebrows
among top executives or other board members. Furthermore, a reputa-
tion for loyalty may in fact increase a director's desirability to CEOs or
others involved in the selection of board members. 3'
also William T. Allen, Independent Directors in MBO Transactions: Are They Fact or Fantasy?, 45
Bus. LAW. 2055, 2061-63 (1990) (arguing that it is a sense of duty that creates effective independent
directors).
126. Diekmann et al., supra note 74, at 1061; see, e.g., Chugh et al., supra note 8, at 81-86 (point-
ing out that people want to see themselves as moral, competent, and deserving); Cialdini & Goldstein,
supra note 123, at 604 ("Individuals are driven to be consistent not only with their trait self-
attributions, but with their previous behaviors and commitments as well.").
127. Beam, 845 A.2d at 1052. For discussions of the role of reputation in shaping behavior, see
Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of Corpo-
rate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1793-97 (2001); David A. Skeel, Jr., Shaming in Corporate Law,
149 U. PA. L. REV. 1811, 1814-23 (2001); and Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms,
99 COLUM. L. REV. 1253, 1255-64 (1999).
128. Beam, 845 A.2d at 1043.
129. See Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, The Separation of Ownership and Control. 26 J.L.
& ECON. 301, 315 (1983) (arguing that an efficient labor market serves to control directors, as direc-
tors' reputations affect their chance for future board appointments); see also Michael P. Dooley & E.
Norman Veasey, The Role of the Board in Derivative Litigation: Delaware Law and Current ALl Pro-
posals Compared, 44 Bus. LAW. 503, 535 (1989) (dismissing the argument "that outside directors gen-
erally are more willing to risk reputation and future income than they are to risk the social embar-
rassment of calling a colleague to account"). But see Velasco, supra note 70, at 825 (arguing in favor of
an intermediate standard of review for situations where the directors may have subtle conflicts of in-
terest that are not powerful enough to warrant the entire fairness standard).
130. Velasco, supra note 70, at 859-60.
131. See Dorf, supra note 122, at 2032-33 ("Directors who wish to remain in office ... need to
please whoever determines the composition of the corporation's slate of nominees.").
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Veasey relies not on reputation (and possible future remuneration)
but rather on individual probity:
Friendship, golf companionship, and social relationships are not fac-
tors that necessarily negate independence.... [T]here is nothing to
suggest that, on an issue of questioning the loyalty of the CEO, the
bridge partner of the CEO cannot act independently as a director.
To make a blanket argument otherwise would create a dubious pre-
sumption that the director would sell his or her soul for friend-
ship.
132
To the contrary, the blanket argument otherwise is merely that even
the most ethical director may make a decision influenced by friendship,
without awareness or intention. Directors might not knowingly sell their
soul, but that does not mean their souls are uncompromised. Our other
motivations, in combination with cognitive effects, may result in us being
unable to see the conflicts.1 33 Perhaps the advantages of the current ap-
proach outweigh the disadvantages, but one need not impugn the integ-
rity of directors to argue otherwise.
Reputation, personal conscience, and self-image arguments may
well be persuasive, but the arguments apply only to influences of which
the person is aware. One might stipulate that most directors are ethical
(or will not sell their souls for friendship or pecuniary remuneration) and
when charged with making a decision in an unbiased way, will attempt to
do exactly that to the best of their abilities. If, however, bias can result
not from corruption or intentional misfeasance, but rather from uninten-
tional (and often unconscious) motivational and cognitive processes, un-
biased decision making (short of recusal) may be beyond the best of their
abilities.1 34 Chugh and colleagues draw a distinction between visible con-
flicts of interest, which are clear and obvious yet thought to be overcome,
and those that are invisible and thus unrecognized. 35 Structural bias and
directors who are not dominated or controlled may involve both types.
A few conflicts, such as material amounts of money unavailable to share-
holders or close family relationships, are visible conflicts that the law
recognizes as necessarily disqualifying the decision maker. Other con-
flicts are visible, like decisions regarding a lawsuit against a controlling
132. E. Norman Veasey, The Defining Tension in Corporate Governance in America, 52 Bus.
LAW. 393, 405-06 (1997). Veasey goes on to state, however, that "directors must be aware of any ap-
pearance that they lack independence" and that "the better practice is that each director should be
like Caesar's wife: above reproach." Id.; see also Dooley & Veasey, supra note 129, at 537 (arguing
that asserting the "argument in favor of closer judicial review of board decisions on loyalty matters is
to assert that independent directors are more likely to risk their reputations to excuse cheating than to
excuse carelessness").
133. See infra Part IV.D.
134. See generally Moore & Lowenstein, supra note 98 (summarizing research); Jason Dana &
George Lowenstein, A Social Science Perspective on Gifts to Physicians from Industry, 290 J. AM.
MED. ASS'N 252 (2003).
135. Chugh et al., supra note 8, at 91.
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shareholder, but seen as controllable. Still others, such as some motive-
based conflicts, are visible to some but unrecognized by others. 136
Several different prototypes for considering biased evidence proc-
essing also exist.137 At one extreme is fraud-"intentional, conscious ef-
forts to fabricate, conceal, or distort evidence." 3' In the middle is advo-
cacy-"the selective use and emphasis of evidence to promote a
hypothesis, without outright concealment or fabrication." '39 The argu-
ments regarding reputation or good faith are addressed only to these two
prototypes, primarily advocacy.
Contemporary psychologists, however, recognize unintentional bias
as another prototype. 4° This prototype concerns bias that is involuntary,
unconscious, and can occur even when the decision maker is seeking an
accurate conclusion in addition to having a preferred conclusion.141
In the following Part, I argue that decision makers, regardless of
their good intentions, are frequently unable to put aside their biases. The
above biases and motivations are not necessarily, or in some cases even
likely to be, secret. Most of us are aware that we are likely to be favora-
bly disposed towards groups of which we are members, our friends, and
anything that socially or financially benefits us. Certainly, we are aware
that others have those biases.' 4' We think, however, that we can com-
pensate for those biases. Cognitive processes, many of which are uncon-
scious, may prevent decision makers from even realizing that their biases
are influencing their decisions.14' Put differently, conscious and uncon-
scious biases will affect decision making and sometimes be determina-
tive. Thus, internal pressure to do the right thing or a desire to maintain
a reputation for fair-mindedness in the community will not necessarily
136. See Emily Pronin & Matthew B. Kugler, Valuing Thoughts, Ignoring Behavior: The Intro-
spection Illusion as a Source of the Bias Blind Spot, 43 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 565, 575-76
(2007).
137. Robert J. MacCoun, Biases in the Interpretation and Use of Research Results, 49 ANN. REV.
PSYCHOL. 259,267-69 (1998).
138. Id. at 268.
139. Id.
140. Id. (describing both unintentional cognitive and motivational biases).
141. Id. at 269-73.
142. Emily Pronin et al., Objectivity in the Eye of the Beholder: Divergent Perceptions of Bias in
Self Versus Others, 111 PSYCHOL. REV. 781, 784-88 (2004).
143. Cognitive processes "[refer] to all processes by which the sensory input is transformed, re-
duced, elaborated, stored, recovered, and used." ULRIC NEISSER, COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 4 (1967).
By contrast, an approach beginning with motivations: "Instead of asking how a man's actions and ex-
periences result from what he saw, remembered, or believed, the dynamic psychologist asks how they
follow from the subject's goals, needs, or instincts." Id. The modem consensus is that both cognition
and motivation interact to result in biased decision making. See Dan Simon, A Third View of the
Black Box: Cognitive Coherence in Legal Decision Making, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 511, 541 (2004) (report-
ing that "[t]he prevailing consensus is that motivations guide and interact with the cognitive system,
influencing how people reason and perceive their environments"). For the purposes of this article we
need not address precisely whether cognitive or motivational processes are at work. See also Susan T.
Fiske, Intent and Ordinary Bias: Unintended Thought and Social Motivation Create Casual Prejudice,
17 SOC. JUST. RES. 117, 125 (2004) (suggesting that the distinction between motivation and cognition is
absurd because our brains do not neatly distinguish these processes).
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result in an unbiased decision. This failure stems not from a director's
unwillingness to be neutral but from a lack of ability. In short, people
are hardwired to enact their unconscious biases.'"
Although people are aware of many biases, they will frequently not
recognize situations involving potential bias and conflict of interest. Sub-
tle conflicts of interest, like those involving directors' indirect personal
and social benefits, "may not be obvious to the involved agents who in-
terpret their situations differently from impartial observers." 4 ' By re-
maining oblivious to the potential conflict of interest, a decision maker
can more easily reach a personally desirable conclusion."
IV. UNCONSCIOUS PROCESSES
Based on the above described biases, directors, independent or oth-
erwise, are reasonably likely to hold certain views toward questions
posed to the board. For example, should we approve the CEO compen-
sation package? (Yes, because he is like us, a member of my group, and
thus he deserves it; and for directors who are also CEOs, yes, because it
may favorably affect my own compensation.) Should we approve an-
other firm's takeover bid of our company? (No, because we have man-
aged the firm well and because I want to retain the benefits associated
with board membership.) Should we allow a derivative suit to go for-
ward? (No, because this involves a suit against a group of which I am a
member; and if it also targets a controlling shareholder, no, because I do
not want to lose the benefits of board membership.) 47 Should we ap-
prove this conflict of interest transaction between our company and an-
other director? (Yes, this transaction is likely to be fair to the company,
144. Moore and Loewenstein argue that the brain actually processes motives in different ways. In
particular, they argue that a person's ethical and professional responsibilities (such as a director's obli-
gation to fairly assess the merits of a derivative suit against a controlling shareholder) are more likely
to be processed consciously, whereas a person's self interest (such as a director's desire to stay on the
board of directors) tends to be processed automatically. See Moore & Loewenstein, supra note 98, at
190. Because automatic processing occurs unconsciously, "its influence on judgment and decision
making is difficult to eliminate or completely correct. The consequence of this differential processing
is that self-interest often prevails, even when decision makers consciously attempt to comply with the
ethical mandates of their profession." Id. at 190-91.
145. Thagard, supra note 92, at 369.
146. See David M. Bersoff, Why Good People Sometimes Do Bad Things: Motivated Reasoning
and Unethical Behavior, 25 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 28, 38 (1999) (observing that "peo-
ple commonly distort the moral implications of their desired behavioral response and end up acting
contrary" to their motivations or morality, honesty, and personal integrity).
147. A director's attitude towards a derivative suit is also likely to be negative because directors
fear personal liability and because they perceive few benefits to shareholders. See Robert B. Thomp-
son & Randall S. Thomas. The Public and Private Faces of Derivative Lawsuits, 57 VAND. L. REV.
1747, 1748 (2004) (noting that "derivative suits are today regularly portrayed as nuisance suits whose
'principal beneficiaries.., are attorneys"') (citations omitted).
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because members of my group are like me, and thus likely to be fairer
and more ethical than average.) 148
Directors may, of course, be consciously aware of their biases. (For
example, I do not believe that Martha would have misbehaved; thus, I do
not think a suit against her should go forward.) We generally know that
we like our friends, support members of our groups, and favor decisions
that benefit us. Regardless of awareness, however, having a theory, ini-
tial predisposition, or preference will often unconsciously affect our deci-
sion-making processes.'49 The ideal is unbiased evidence processing: a
director should make a decision based solely on the business merits and
an unbiased evaluation of all reasonably available relevant informa-
tion. 5' The problem is that decision makers often act like "intuitive law-
yers" who desire "predetermined, particular conclusions" rather than
"intuitive scientists" who desire "optimal, accurate conclusions."15' The
next Sections examine various psychological processes that allow people
to confirm their initial theories and predispositions, and thus reach pre-
ferred decisions.
A. The Importance of the Starting Point
An independent director is faced with a decision in an area likely to
raise group- or self-interest concerns. The director is not likely (and may
be unable) to start from a completely blank slate. 52 He or she will likely
have a starting point, probably reached very quickly.'53 "[T]he starting
point of a decision process has a disproportionate effect on its out-
148. It is worth noting that the Enron board, when faced with the proposed transactions between
Enron's CFO Andrew Fastow and Enron that ultimately led to Enron's implosion, knowingly sus-
pended Enron's code of ethics as a necessary preliminary step before acceptance. See ENRON
REPORT, supra note 115, at 24.
149. See, e.g., Erica Dawson et al., Motivated Reasoning and Performance on the Wason Selection
Task, 28 PERSONALITY SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1379 (2002); Peter H. Ditto & David F. Lopez, Moti-
vated Skepticism: Use of Differential Decision Criteria for Preferred and Nonpreferred Conclusions, 63
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 568, 569-70 (1992); Timothy D. Wilson et al., Mental Contamina-
tion and the Debiasing Problem, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE
JUDGMENT 185, 186-87 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002).
150. Of course, even scientists do not necessarily follow this approach. See MacCoun, supra note
137, at 263-64, 279-81 (examining bias or perceived bias of social scientists in selecting and interpret-
ing research evidence).
151. Roy F. Baumeister & Leonard S. Newman, Self-Regulation of Cognitive Inference and Deci-
sion Processes, 20 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 3, 3 (1994); see also Jonathan Haidt, The
Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment, 108 PSYCHOL.
REV. 814, 820 (2001) ("The reasoning process is more like a lawyer defending a client than a judge or
scientist seeking truth.").
152. MICHAEL S. GAZZANIGA, THE ETHICAL BRAIN 161 (2005) ("Humans are belief-formation
machines. We form beliefs fast and firmly, and then deepen them.... We become beholden to them
and will adhere to them even in the face of information to the contrary.").
153. John A. Bargh & Tanya L. Chartrand, The Unbearable Automaticity of Being, 54 AM.
PSYCHOL. 462,475 (1999) (noting that "our preferences and many other judgments may be made liter-
ally before we know it").
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come." '154 For example, people may reach a different decision between
two mutually exclusive alternatives depending on whether they are asked
to choose or reject an alternative.155 In one experiment, researchers in-
structed subjects to adjudicate a child custody case in which one parent
must be granted sole custody.'56 Although awarding sole custody to one
parent is functionally equivalent to denying sole custody to the other,
whether subjects were asked to award or deny custody affected final de-
cisions."'
If the director's starting point involves "initial judgments, choices,
or beliefs," several lines of research show that the cognition is more
likely to be confirmed. 5' Surprisingly, "[slimply entertaining a belief
elevates the perceived informativeness of evidence that may confirm that
belief." '159 Psychologist Daniel Gilbert has developed an explanation." °
He argues that social and cognitive psychology suggest that human belief
procedures do not follow the expected stages of, first, understanding a
proposition and, then, deciding whether to accept or reject it. 6 '
Instead, when we first understand a proposition we accept it as true,
and then only later, if we judge it to be false, do we "unaccept" it.162 Ei-
ther procedure would reach the same result if we had unlimited cognitive
resources. But because our cognitive resources are bounded, and be-
cause the second stage requires greater effort (unaccepting a proposition
is difficult), the systems result in different end states. Supporting this
view, when people's cognitive resources are stretched they are more
likely to believe that false propositions are true, but not that true propo-
154. Samuel D. Bond et al., Information Distortion in the Evaluation of a Single Option, 102 ORG.
BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 240, 240 (2007) (testing "the idea that individuals, having not
yet committed to a particular course of action, bias their interpretation of new information to support
an initial disposition").
155. Eldar B. Shafir, Choosing Versus Rejecting: Why Some Options Are Both Better and Worse
than Others, 21 MEMORY & COGNITION 546, 548-50 (1993); see also Amos Tversky & Itamar Gati,
Studies of Similarity, in COGNITION AND CATEGORIZATION 79, 83 (Eleonor Rosch & Barbara B.
Lloyd eds., 1978) (finding that subjects would conclude that East and West Germany were more or
less different than Nepal and Sri Lanka depending on whether they were asked which countries were
more similar or which countries were more different).
156. Shafir, supra note 155, at 549.
157. Id. at 553-54. Shafir concluded that "[wihether we end up choosing or rejecting often seems
an accident of fate." Id. at 554.
158. Tobias Greitemeyer & Stefan Schulz-Hardt, Preference-Consistent Evaluation of Information
in the Hidden Profile Paradigm: Beyond Group-Level Explanations for the Dominance of Shared In-
formation in Group Decisions, 84 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 322, 323 (2003) ("[S]everal lines
of research show that people are somehow reluctant to revise initial judgments, choices or beliefs.").
159. William B. Swann, Jr. & Toni Giuliano. Confirmatory Search Strategies in Social Interaction:
How, When, Why, and with What Consequences, 5 J. SOC. & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 511, 522 (1987).
160. See Daniel T. Gilbert, How Mental Systems Believe, 46 AM. PSYCHOL. 107, 107 (1991).
161. Id. at 107 (describing understanding followed by acceptance or rejection as Cartesian).
162. Id. at 107-08 (describing understanding and acceptance as simultaneous, possibly to be fol-
lowed by "unaccepting," as Spinozan). Or as William James described Spinoza's view, "All proposi-
tions ... are believed through the very fact of being conceived." Id. at 108 (quoting WILLIAM JAMES,
THE PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY 136 (1890)).
No. 1]
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
sitions are false. 163 If Gilbert is correct that people's brains follow the
second procedure rather than the first, then a confirmatory search, as de-
scribed below, is reasonable because such searches often prove more in-
formative than other types of searches."6
As the above suggests, a director is unlikely to be aware of the im-
pact of the starting place, because much of the impact will occur as un-
conscious information processing. 65 In addition, this effect is likely to be
even stronger if the starting place is linked to the director's motivation."
The next Sections examine how this unconscious information processing
occurs and can bias the decision. In short, the unconscious affects both
the information search and the evaluation of what is found. 67
B. Motivated Reasoning
Francis Bacon observed that "[tlhe human understanding resembles
not a dry light, but admits a tincture of the will and passions, which gen-
erate their own system accordingly, for man always believes more readily
that which he prefers."'68 Contemporary psychologists have reached the
same conclusion as Bacon. 169 The notion has even become widespread in
163. Daniel T. Gilbert et al., Unbelieving the Unbelievable: Some Problems in the Rejection of
False Information, 59 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 601,603 (1990).
164. Gilbert, suprd note 160, at 115.
165. Tom Pyszczynski & Jeff Greenberg, Toward an Integration of Cognitive and Motivational
Perspectives on Social Inference: A Biased Hypothesis-Testing Model, in 20 ADVANCES IN
EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 297, 305 (Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1987) (observing that "[a]
great deal of information processing occurs at a level beneath conscious awareness").
166. Id. at 330 ("A self-serving bias is likely to intrude on the selection of hypotheses for testing,
the generation of inference rules, the search for attribution-relevant information, the evaluation of the
information that one accesses, and the amount of confirmatory and disconfirmatory evidence that is
required before an inference is made.").
167. Although to the author's knowledge no one has yet explained how the unconscious might
affect independent directors' decision making, the means by which this might happen has been looked
at in other contexts. For example, Judge Posner reached a similar conclusion regarding the impact of
judicial biases:
I doubt that any of the justices has so debased a conception of the judicial office as to try de-
liberately to swing the election to his preferred Presidential candidate. But the undeniable inter-
est that a judge, especially a Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, has in who his colleagues and suc-
cessors will be is likely to have alerted the Justices to features of Bush v. Gore that might
otherwise have eluded them. The conservative Justices may have been more sensitive to argu-
ments based on Article II and the equal protection clause than they otherwise would have been,
and the liberal Justices more sensitive to the weaknesses of those arguments than they otherwise
would have been.
RICHARD A. POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK: THE 2000 ELECTION, THE CONSTITUTION, AND
THE COURTS 180 (2001). Jerome Frank, a leading legal realist who served on the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit, also suggested the impact of unconscious bias, observing that
"[flacts ... are what the judge thinks they are," and not necessarily objective reality. JEROME FRANK,
LAW AND THE MODERN MIND xviii (1930).
168. FRANCIS BACON, NOVUM ORGANUM 26 (Joseph Devey ed., P.F. Collier & Sons 1902)
(1620), available at http://oll.libertyfund.org/title/1432 (emphasis added).
169. See, e.g., Tanya L. Chartrand & John A. Bargh, Automatic Activation of Impression Forma-
tion and Memorization Goals: Nonconscious Goal Priming Reproduces Effects of Explicit Task In-
structions, 71 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 464, 464 (1996) (stating that it is today uncontrover-
sial to say that a person's "[i]ntentions and goals affect not only what one considers important enough
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popular culture. Witness the linguists' "word of the year" for 2005:
"truthiness," defined as "the quality of stating concepts one wishes or be-
lieves to be true, rather than the facts.""17 Psychologists have referred to
this process as motivated reasoning, where motivation refers to any
"wish, desire or preference that concerns the outcome of a given reason-
ing task... "171 Numerous studies illustrate the phenomenon.17 2 For ex-
ample, one early experiment demonstrated how subjects, informed that
they were either a better or worse performer than average, were able to
easily, and self-servingly, explain their better or worse performance."'
Likewise, studies of doctors, accountants, auditors, and lawyers demon-
strate such motivated reasoning.'74
to pay attention to, but also how one uses, interprets, and subsequently remembers that information");
David Dunning et al., What the Commentators Motivated Us to Think About, 10 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY
79, 79 (1999) (concluding that "[t]he debate over whether motivation influences judgment has been
settled"); Arie W. Kruglanski, Motivated Social Cognition: Principles of the Interface, in SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY: HANDBOOK OF BASIC PRINCIPLES 493, 493 (E. Tory Higgins & Arie W. Kruglanski
eds., 1996); Thagard, supra note 92, at 376 (noting that there is "abundant psychological evidence" of
the impact motivation on people's beliefs).
170. Linguists Vote 'Truthiness' the Word of the Year, WASH. POST, Jan. 7, 2006, at E18. (Truthi-
ness is also included in the Oxford English Dictionary.)
171. Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOL. BULL. 480, 480 (1990). It is
possible that a decision maker's motivation may be to make an accurate choice. There is evidence that
decision makers motivated to be accurate (and with no reason to prefer one alternative to another)
process information more carefully and follow more complex cognitive strategies. Id. at 482. In some
circumstances, however, the goal to be accurate may in fact increase bias. Id. For example, accuracy-
motivated subjects were more likely to weight irrelevant information to moderate a prediction than
those who were not motivated. See Philip E. Tetlock & Richard Boettger, Accountability: A Social
Magnifier of the Dilution Effect, 57 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 388, 397 (1989); see also Arie
W. Kruglanski, Motivation and Social Cognition: Enemies or a Love Story?, 1 INT. J. PSYCHOL. &
PSYCHOL. THERAPY 33, 41 (2001) (defining a goal as "[a] desirable state of affairs attainable through
one's actions").
172. An example is the classic study in which Dartmouth and Princeton fans watched a football
game between the two schools, and were asked to report any infractions and rate their seriousness.
The two fan groups, according to the study's authors, were so biased that they appeared to see vastly
different games. David M. Messick & Keith Sentiss, Fairness, Preferences and Fairness Biases, in
EQUITY THEORY: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 61, 83 (David M. Messick &
Karen S. Cook eds., 1993) (citing A.H. Hastorf & H. Cantrill, They Saw a Game: A Case Study, 49 J.
ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 129, 130 (1954)).
173. Lee Ross et al., Perseverance in Self-Perception and Social Perception: Biased Attributional
Processes in the Debriefing Paradigm, 32 J. PERSONALITY & SOCIAL PSYCHOL. 880, 884 (1975); see
also Lee Ross et al., Social Explanation and Social Expectation: The Effects of Real and Hypothetical
Explanations upon Subjective Likelihood, 35 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 817, 826 (1977). For
more recent experiments, see, e.g., Lisa Sinclair & Ziva Kunda, Motivated Stereotyping of Women:
She's Fine if She Praised Me but Incompetent if She Criticized Me, 26 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
BULL. 1329, 1340 (2000) (finding that students who received lower grades from female professors were
more likely to use negative stereotypes about female professors); Lisa Sinclair & Ziva Kunda, Reac-
tions to a Black Professional: Motivated Inhibition and Activation of Conflicting Stereotypes, 77 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 885, 902 (1999) (finding that people praised by an African-American
were less likely to use negative African-American stereotypes).
174. See Samuel Issacharoff, Legal Responses to Conflicts of Interest, in CONFLICTS OF INTEREST,
supra note 8, at 189, 190 (lawyers recommending that clients initiate lawsuits); Jerome P. Kassirer,
Physicians' Financial Ties with the Pharmaceutical Industry: A Critical Element of a Formidable Mar-
keting Network, in CONFLICTS OF INTEREST, supra note 8, at 133, 138-39 (doctors prescribing drugs
manufactured by companies that have provided incentives to them); Mark W. Nelson, A Review of
Experimental and Archival Conflicts-of-Interest Research in Auditing, in CONFLICTS OF INTEREST, su-
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As one might expect, to be effective-in other words, to genuinely
believe what one desires to be true or to genuinely believe that one's de-
cision is untainted by extraneous motivations-motivated reasoning must
be largely immune to conscious examination. Accordingly, decision
makers acting in good faith will attempt to be rational and reach a per-
suasive conclusion.'75 They will not, however, realize that their attempt
to be rational may be biased by their goal. 1
76
Psychologists have argued that a person's goals may alter percep-
tions, attitudes, and attributions. 177 Motivation may also "affect reason-
ing through reliance on a biased set of cognitive processes: strategies for
accessing, constructing, and evaluating beliefs."'78 Furthermore, the deci-
sion maker does not even have to be conscious of the goal, or have con-
sciously selected it. 79 Put somewhat differently, "conscious choice is not
necessary for goal activation and operation."'8
How then does motivated reasoning occur? Gilovich suggests that
decision makers in fact ask a different question depending on how eager
they are to reach a particular conclusion. "For desired conclusions ... it
is as if we ask ourselves 'Can I believe this?,' but for unpalatable conclu-
sions we ask, 'Must I believe this?"""' The legal analog would be that for
desired conclusions one asks, "Could a reasonable person believe it?"
whereas for undesirable conclusions one asks, "Would all reasonable
people believe it?" The burden of persuasion is much lower for the first
question.
Of course, people sometimes reach undesirable conclusions. People
are motivated not only toward their desired conclusion, but also to be
pra note 8, at 41, 50-51 (describing factors that compromise the objectivity of accounting firms); Don
A. Moore et al., Auditor Independence, Conflict of Interest, and the Unconscious Intrusion of Bias 6
(Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 03-116, 2003) (describing auditors' bias in favor of their cli-
ents). Self-interested decision making is not limited to the professions. Academics who have studies
accepted attribute their success to the quality of the article, whereas those who have studies rejected
attribute the result to factors such as an unlucky choice of reviewers. Mary Glenn Wiley et al., Why a
Rejection? Causal Attribution of a Career Achievement Event, SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 214, 217-19 (1979).
175. Kunda, supra note 171, at 482-83 (1990) (proposing "that people motivated to arrive at a
particular conclusion attempt to be rational and to construct a justification of their desired conclusion
that would persuade a dispassionate observer").
176. Id. at 483 (arguing that "people do not realize that the [reasoning] process is biased by their
goals").
177. Id. at 493.
178. Id. at 480.
179. Chartrand & Bargh, supra note 169, at 469-73 (demonstrating that goals could be activated
and affect memories without the conscious awareness of participants); see also John A. Bargh et al.,
The Automated Will: Nonconscious Activation and Pursuit of Behavioral Goals, 81 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 1014, 1024 (2001) (showing that people can have behavioral goals without conscious
awareness of them, and that these nonconscious goals then operate and affect behavior in a similar
way to consciously chosen goals); Bargh & Chartrand, supra note 153, at 462-64 (reviewing studies
showing the automatic activation of goals); James S. Uleman, When Do Unconscious Goals Cloud Our
Minds?, in 9 ADVANCES IN SOCIAL COGNMON 165,165-66 (Robert S. Wyer ed., 1996).
180. Chartrand & Bargh, supra note 169, at 465.
181. THOMAS GILOVICH, How WE KNOW WHAT ISN'T SO 84 (1991).
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both rational and perceived as rational.182 Thus, motivation can affect or
influence our judgments but cannot completely control them.I1 3 In short,
enough evidence to support the desired conclusion must exist, but "the
process of justification construction can itself be biased by our goals."'"
If a derivative suit accuses the CEO of criminal behavior and the evi-
dence is overwhelming, directors allow the suit to go forward, or, when
faced with a tremendous takeover premium, target boards accept the of-
fer. Motivated reasoning will assist directors in reaching a preferred re-
sult only in those gray areas where reasonable minds might differ.
C. Predecisional Information Processing
"The human understanding, when any proposition has been once
laid down.., forces everything else to add fresh support and confirma-
tion; and although most cogent and abundant instances may exist to the
contrary, yet either does not observe or despises them... rather than
sacrifice the authority of its first conclusions."'85
As Bacon hypothesized, numerous studies have shown that people
will frequently either neglect or reject disconfirming information. This
process, termed confirmation bias, creates a tendency for people to
search for and interpret new information as supportive of current beliefs
and to fail to search for, ignore, discredit, or underweight unsupportive
information.'86 Although some people are corrupt and do this con-
sciously, many people will do this in good faith. In other words, they are
unaware of the self-interested bias by which they process information.
Overall, this distortion of information has been demonstrated on
more than just the usual collection of college students. Russo and col-
leagues tested professionals, including auditors, and found they also bi-
ased their information processing.'87 Schulz-Hardt and colleagues looked
at executives of both financial and industrial companies and found con-
firmation bias equal to that of college students regarding financial in-
182. See supra Part 11I.C.
183. ZIVA KUNDA, SOCIAL COGNITION 224 (1999) (noting that "despite our best efforts to be ob-
jective and rational, motivation may nevertheless color our judgment"); Thagard, supra note 92, at 376
("There is abundant psychological evidence that people's beliefs are determined in part by their moti-
vations as well as by the available evidence.").
184. KUNDA, supra note 183, at 224.
185. BACON, supra note 168, at 23.
186. See generally Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in
Many Guises, 2 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175 (1998). It has also been referred to as the "positive test
strategy." See Joshua Klayman & Young-Won Ha, Confirmation, Disconfirmation, and Information in
Hypothesis Testing, 94 PSYCHOL. REV. 211, 213 (1987). For an extensive bibliography of scholarly ar-
ticles addressing the confirmation bias, see Confirmation Bias/Confirmatory Bias, http://confirmation-
bias.behaviouralfinance.net/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2008).
187. J. Edward Russo et al., Predecisional Distortion of Information by Auditors and Salespersons,
46 MGMT. SCI. 13, 13 (2000); see also Stefan Schulz-Hardt et al., Biased Information Search in Group
Decision Making, 78 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 655,659-60 (2000) (finding biased information
processing in groups of midlevel managers).
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vestments.' 88 A correlation between investment professionals' evalua-
tions of the desirability and likelihood of economic outcomes has also
been found.1 89 Desirable outcomes were seen as more likely to occur
than undesirable outcomes."9
Based on an extensive review of the predecision processing litera-
ture, Brownstein identified the following preconditions under conflict
theory for biased predecision processing: "When decision makers are in
danger of experiencing negative consequences due to risks associated
with two or more alternatives (i.e., are in conflict), have no hope of find-
ing a better solution, and cannot delay or defer the decision, they can be
expected to conduct selective information searches or report spreading
evaluations of the alternatives." '' These preconditions are frequently
the case for directors' decisions in subtle conflict of interest situations.
If biased information processing exists, it likely "increases as the
importance of the task increases," "[w]hen [decision makers] expect to
choose one of the alternatives," and "when the alternatives involve more
negative consequences."' 92 Decisions of the board of directors tend to
involve each of these factors. Brownstein also states "that biased proc-
essing increases as the difficulty of the decision increases."'93 Again, dif-
ficult decisions are likely to be the norm for these decisions,'94 or rather it
is difficult decisions where we should be most concerned about uncon-
scious biases.
Research suggests that group processes, such as a board's delibera-
tion, can in fact increase biased predecision processing over that of indi-
viduals.'95 Groups, just like individuals, prefer supporting to conflicting
188. Ditto & Lopez, supra note 149, at 570 ("An eclectic body of theory and research, therefore,
supports the conclusion that information consistent with a preferred judgment conclusion is less likely
to initiate intensive cognitive analysis than is information inconsistent with that conclusion.").
189. See Robert A. Olsen, Desirability Bias Among Professional Investment Managers: Some Evi-
dence from Experts, 10 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 65, 70-71 (1997); see also Brent L. Cohen &
Thomas S. Wallsten, The Effect of Constant Outcome Value on Judgments and Decision Making Given
Linguistic Probabilities, 5 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 53, 53-55 (1992) (finding that people overes-
timated the likelihood of positive outcomes).
190. See Olsen, supra note 189, at 66.
191. Aaron L. Brownstein, Biased Predecision Processing, 129 PSYCHOL. BULL. 545, 548, 559
(2003) (reviewing seven major theories and forty years of empirical studies on biased predecision
processing, and concluding that many studies have "found biased processing before ... committing [a]
consequential decision").
192. Id. at 561.
193. Id. Granted, there are some mechanisms at work that may reduce biased processing, such as
when a decision will have to be justified to others.
194. Cox & Munsinger, supra note 99, at 88 (referring to the decision whether to continue a de-
rivative suit as a "multifaceted, inherently complex choice").
195. Schulz-Hardt et al., supra note 187, at 666; see also Brownstein, supra note 191, at 561
("[W]hen decision making occurs in a group setting, group members are more likely to selectively
search for information favorable to a preliminary favorite than individuals making private decisions.").
Whether groups are more or less biased than the people composing the groups, depends on the nature
and strength of the bias, the decision process, and the distribution of individual preferences in the
group. Norbert L. Kerr et al., Bias in Judgment: Comparing Individuals and Groups, 103 PSYCHOL.
REV. 687, 693 (1996) (concluding that there is no simple answer to the question whether groups are
more biased than individuals).
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information, and the effect increases the more the group prefers the sup-
ported alternative.196 Groups may be more or less biased than the people
composing the groups, depending on the nature and strength of the bias,
the decision process, and the distribution of individual preferences in the
group.
197
The following Subsections first review evidence of biased informa-
tion searches, in the sense that a decision maker will selectively search or
selectively retrieve information, and then evidence of selective interpre-
tation and evaluation. Finally, this Article examines how information is
remembered.
1. Selective Search and Exposure
People approach an information task differently depending on their
initial theory or belief.I98 Generally a decision maker will attempt to
evaluate an uncertain proposition, such as "this derivative suit against my
colleagues is without merit," by constructing a case to support the propo-
sition rather than by attempting to discredit it. People tend to actively
seek evidence confirming their theory or supporting their attitudes or
expectations.199 This confirmation bias has been demonstrated in numer-
ous areas.20 It may even have contributed to both space shuttle disas-
ters.2"1 The bias can arise even when researchers offer subjects rewards
196. Schulz-Hardt et al.,supra note 187, at 666.
197. Id.
198. Part III has described why it is likely that independent directors will have theories or beliefs
biased in favor of the group or themselves.
199. Dieter Frey et al., Information Seeking Among Individuals and Groups and Possible Conse-
quences for Decision Making in Business and Politics, in 2 UNDERSTANDING GROUP BEHAVIOR:
SMALL GROUP PROCESSES AND INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS 211,212-20 (Erich H. Witte & James H.
Davis eds., 1996) (reviewing studies in both individual and group contexts); Eva Jonas et al., Confir-
mation Bias in Sequential Information Search After Preliminary Decisions: An Expansion of Disso-
nance Theoretical Research on Selective Exposure to Information, 80 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 557, 557 (2001) ("When people seek new information, these information search processes
are often biased in favor of the information seeker's previously held beliefs, expectations or desired
conclusions."); Kunda, supra note 171, at 494 ("[Pleople are biased toward seeking instances that are
consistent with a hypothesis that they are testing rather than instances that are inconsistent with it.");
see also Sharon R. Lundgren & Radmila Prislin, Motivated Cognitive Processing and Attitude Change,
24 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 715, 722-23 (1998) (attitudes); Robin L. Pinkley et al.,
"Fixed Pie" a la Mode: Information Availability, Information Processing, and the Negotiation of Subop-
timal Agreements, 62 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 101, 105-06 (1995) (negotiations).
200. See, e.g., Arthur S. Elstein & Georges Bordage, Psychology of Clinical Reasoning, in
HEALTH PSYCHOLOGY-A HANDBOOK 333, 352-58 (George C. Stone et al. eds., 1979) (medicine);
Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, The Story Model for Juror Decision Making, in INSIDE THE JUROR:
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JURY DECISION MAKING 192, 192-96 (Reid Hastie ed., 1993) (law); Ryan D.
Tweney, A Framework for the Cognitive Psychology of Science, in PSYCHOLOGY OF SCIENCE:
CONTRIBUTING TO METASCIENCE 342, 346-49 (Barry Gholson et al. eds., 1989) (science) see also Mi-
chael J. Mahoney, Publication Prejudices: An Experimental Study of Confirmatory Bias in the Peer
Review System, 1 COGNITvE THERAPY & RES. 161,162 (1977) ("[Tihe most costly expression of [con-
firmatory bias) may be among scientists themselves.").
201. See David E. Sanger, Report on Loss of Shuttle Focuses on NASA Blunders and Issues Som-
ber Warning, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27,2003, at Al.
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for (and are thus assumed to have a motivation in favor of) accuracy.'
The bias may well be strongest in those instances where the decision
maker is self-interested. 23  As a result, "[t]hese biased information
search processes lead to the maintenance of the information seeker's po-
sition, even if this position is not justified on the basis of all available in-
formation. "204
Professor Wason performed one of the first studies demonstrating
selective search in 1960.25 Researchers presented subjects with a series
of numbers that conformed to a mathematical rule (e.g., 2, 4, 6).2o' The
subjects' task was to determine the rule, which they did by generating
their own series of three numbers. Although the underlying rule was
simply that the numbers ascended, typically subjects generated more
complex rules, such as the numbers increased by two.20 7 Subjects tended
to test only series of numbers consistent with their initial hypothesis (e.g.,
6, 8, 10) rather than inconsistent (e.g., 6, 10, 12).208
In another experiment, participants asked whether practicing before
playing tennis was related to winning concentrated on the times where
this occurred, whereas those participants asked to determine whether
practicing was related to losing focused on losing situations.2' 9 Another
example involved experimenters asking subjects to determine whether
someone was extroverted or introverted. Subjects were much more
likely to ask questions that would confirm the presence of introversion if
answered affirmatively.21° Sometimes participants asked questions with
202. George Loewenstein et al., Self-Serving Assessments of Fairness and Pretrial Bargaining, 22 J.
LEGAL STUD. 135, 159 (1993) (finding that people exhibited self-serving biases even when paid to
make accurate judgments).
203. Pyszczynski & Greenberg, supra note 165, at 319 (observing that "selective exposure to in-
formation consistent with a self-serving conclusion is one important means through which individuals
maintain an illusion of objectivity concerning their attributions"). Several theories have been devel-
oped to explain this phenomenon. See, e.g., Shelly Chaiken et al., Heuristic and Systematic Informa-
tion Processing Within and Beyond the Persuasion Context, in UNINTENDED THOUGHT 212 (James S.
Uleman & John A. Bargh eds., 1989) (multiple motive heuristic systematic model); ARIE
KRUGLANSKI, LAY EPISTEMICS AND HUMAN KNOWLEDGE (Elliot Aronson ed., 1989) (lay epis-
temics); Kunda, supra note 171 (motivated cognition).
204. Eva Jonas et al., supra note 199, at 557; see also Ziva Kunda et al., Directional Questions Di-
rect Self-Conceptions, 29 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 63, 63 (1993) (finding that subjects reached
hypothesis-consistent conclusions based on a selective search for information).
205. Peter C. Wason, On the Failure to Eliminate Hypotheses in a Conceptual Task, 12 Q.J.
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 129, 130 (1960) [hereinafter Wason, Failure]; see also Peter C. Wason, Rea-
soning, in NEW HORIZONS IN PSYCHOLOGY 135, 139-42 (Brian M. Foss ed., 1966) (conducting re-
search demonstrating that subjects disproportionately seek evidence that confirms their hypotheses).
206. Wason, Failure, supra note 205, at 131-33.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. See Jennifer Crocker, Biased Questions in Judgment of Covariation Studies, 8 PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 214, 217-18 (1982).
210. See Mark Snyder & William B. Swann, Hypothesis-Testing Processes in Social Interaction, 36
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1202, 1205 (1978) ("[1]ndividuals will systematically formulate con-
firmatory strategies for testing hypotheses about other people."); see also Richard B. Skov & Steven J.
Sherman, Information-Gathering Processes: Diagnosticity, Hypothesis-Confirmatory Strategies, and
Perceived Hypothesis Confirmation, 22 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 93,94 (1986).
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such low diagnostic value that almost anyone, extrovert or introvert,
would respond in the affirmative, but these answers were also used to
confirm the presence of the introversion.2"
Not only may the search for evidence be biased, but the length of
the search may be affected. Typically, decision makers seek more infor-
mation if the earlier information disconfirms the favored hypothesis,
whereas if earlier information confirms the hypothesis, the search may be
brought to an end.2"2
How might this play out in the context of directors' decisions?
Quite simply, if directors already have a theory (e.g., "I do not think the
suit should go forward"), or even more strongly if they have a preference
(e.g., "I do not want the suit to proceed"), directors may seek out infor-
mation that is likely to confirm the theory or preference. For example, in
the derivative suit context, this might mean looking for information
about the high costs of pursuing a suit, such as distracted management or
reduced employee morale, rather than the benefits, such as deterrence of
potential future wrongdoing. It may also mean that the information
search is continued until confirming information is found.
2. Evaluation and Interpretation
"It is the peculiar and perpetual error of the human understanding
to be more moved and excited by affirmatives than negatives.
213
After obtaining information, even if the search were performed ob-
jectively, how then might a director process the information? Not only
might directors be more moved, persuaded, and excited by the confirm-
ing information, they may also evaluate and interpret confirming and
disconfirming information in different ways. 4 Completely unbiased
211. See Skov & Sherman, supra note 210, at 96 (noting how the framing of a question about loud
parties made all respondents seem introverted).
212. GILOVICH, supra note 181, at 56 (noting that "[e]very experimental psychologist I know is
much more likely to run an additional experiment if the results of an initial study refute a favored hy-
pothesis than if the results support it"); Baumeister & Newman, supra note 151, at 4-5; Ditto & Lopez,
supra note 149, at 570 (using the phrase "asymmetrical quantity of processing"); Peter H. Ditto et al.,
Motivated Sensitivity to Preference-Inconsistent Information, 75 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 53,
54 (1998) ("Information inconsistent with a preferred judgment... is more likely to initiate effortful
cognitive analysis.").
213. BACON, supra note 168, Aphorism 46.
214. See generally GAZZANIGA, supra note 152, at 122 ("We are a self-concemed interpreter of all
incoming information."). An illustration of this self-concerned interpretation is the stereotype threat
studies in which Asian women who were reminded that they were Asian before a math test performed
better than Asian women who were given the same math test without being reminded of anything, and
both groups did better than Asian women reminded that they were women before the math test. See
Margaret Shih et al., Stereotype Susceptibility: Identity Salience and Shifts in Quantitative Performance,
10 PSYCHOL. Sci. 80, 83 (1999); Margaret Shih et al., Stereotype Performance Boosts: The Impact of
Self-Relevance and the Manner of Stereotype Activation, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 638, 638
(2002).
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evaluation is unlikely.215 Researchers have demonstrated the biased
evaluation and interpretation of data in favor of the decision maker's ex-
isting preferences in numerous contexts.216
Balcetis and Dunning provide a recent, simple illustration of the
point.1 7 In their studies, researchers showed participants a figure that
could be seen as either the letter B or the number 13, and participants
generally reported that the figure they saw was the figure that rewarded
them. The researchers concluded that "participants' desires, hopes,
fears, or wishful thinking led them to perceive a representation of the
visual environment they desired." '218 Of particular interest, however, was
that this bias appeared preconsciously; participants were generally un-
aware of the alternative interpretation of the figure. Balcetis and Dun-
ning found that "wishful thinking constrains perceptual processes pre-
consciously, before the products of those processes become available to
conscious awareness. '219  In other words, participants' self-serving mo-
tives influenced their data interpretation without any conscious aware-
ness.
Changes in preference or evaluations that occur after a decision-
cognitive dissonance-has long been known as a psychological process.220
"Dissonance research revealed that not only could people be manipu-
lated into telling lies, insulting other people, and eating grasshoppers, but
that they would subsequently change their attitudes to believe the lie that
they told, to derogate the victim of their insult, and to develop a liking
for the taste of grasshoppers. 221  Thus, a director who votes against con-
tinuing a shareholder derivative suit might discount evidence of the
CEO's wrongdoing after the vote, or as argued by Bebchuk and Fried, a
director who is also a highly compensated executive is "likely to have
215. See GAZZANIGA, supra note 152, at 137 (observing that "we don't just neutrally add up in-
coming information").
216. Greitemeyer & Schulz-Hardt, supra note 158, at 324 (citing numerous studies); see also
GAZZANIGA, supra note 152, at 135 ("Our brain is adapted for extreme efficiency; for that reason it
distorts incoming information to fit in with our current beliefs about the world."); David Dunning et
al., Ambiguity and Self-Evaluation: The Role of Idiosyncratic Trait Definitions in Self-Serving Assess-
ments of Ability, 57 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1082, 1089 (1989) (providing evidence of how
ambiguous criteria are interpreted in a self-serving manner).
217. See Emily Balcetis & David Dunning, See What You Want to See: Motivational Influences on
Visual Perception, 91 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 612,615-16 (2006).
218. Balcetis & Dunning, supra note 217, at 621.
219. Id. at 621 (emphasis added).
220. LEON FESTINGER, CONFLICT, DECISION, AND DISSONANCE 153-58 (1964); see also LEON
FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1957). Cognitive dissonance does not, of course,
explain initial decision making because of its ex post etiology. For a review of psychological theories
of cognitive consistency, see Dan Simon & Keith J. Holyoak, Structural Dynamics of Cognition: From
Consistency Theories to Constraint Satisfaction, 6 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 283, 283-86
(2002); Wendy Wood, Attitude Change: Persuasion and Social Influence, 51 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 539
(2000).
221. Simon & Holyoak, supra note 220, at 283 (citations omitted).
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formed a belief that such [compensation] arrangements are desirable and
serve shareholders., 2 2
More recently, however, studies have shown that these changes in
preferences or evaluations (or as a psychologist might put it, "the mental
representation of the decision environment") can occur before the deci-
sion has been made.223 If changes do occur before the decision, then the
changes are playing a causal role in the resulting decision rather than
merely a psychological role afterwards. This process "in which the evi-
dence influences the conclusions and, at the same time, the emerging
conclusion affects the evaluation of the evidence" has been termed bidi-
rectional.224 (By contrast, the normal unidirectional model of decision
making involves a process where an objective evaluation of the evidence
leads to the conclusion.) 225 For example, a director who thinks it unlikely
that the CEO committed any wrongdoing might reweigh or reevaluate
information to be consistent with her intuition. Naturally this makes it
more likely that the final decision will be that there was no wrongdoing,
and thus no lawsuit should proceed. Of course, the decision maker is un-
aware of these changes, in fact, must be unaware of these changes, in or-
der for them to work. This distortion of information has been referred to
as a subset of biased predecisional processing: predecisional distortion of
information.226 It is a way of converting ambiguous, often complex in-
formation into coherent support for a particular decision.
a. Quantity and Quality of Evidence
The threshold regarding how persuasive evidence must be for ac-
cepting or rejecting a hypothesis may differ, depending on whether the
hypothesis is desirable or undesirable.27 Generally, a decision maker
will require less, and less useful, information to accept a desirable hy-
222. BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 107, at 33.
223. See, e.g., Brownstein, supra note 191, at 566 (concluding that research demonstrates that bi-
ased information processing can occur both before the decision maker commits to a decision or even
reaches an internal decision); Keith J. Holyoak & Dan Simon, Bidirectional Reasoning in Decision
Making by Constraint Satisfaction, 128 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 3, 4 (1999) ("[T]he pressure to
achieve coherence guides the decision-making process itself, rather than simply providing post hoc
rationalizations.").
224. Dan Simon et al., The Redux of Cognitive Consistency Theories: Evidence Judgments by Con-
straint Satisfaction, 86 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 814, 814 (2004); see also Nickerson, supra
note 186, at 196 ("Observation and prediction were linked in a circle of mutual confirmation rather
than being independent of each other as we would expect according to the conventional idea of an
experimental test." (quoting HARRY COLLINS & TREVOR PINCH, THE GOLEM: WHAT EVERYONE
SHOULD KNOW ABOUT SCIENCE 45 (1993))).
225. See Nickerson, supra note 186, at 186; Simon et al., supra note 224, at 816.
226. See Kurt A. Carlson & J. Edward Russo, Biased Interpretation of Evidence by Mock Jurors, 7
J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 91, 91 (2001); Simon et al., supra note 224, at 832.
227. See Pyszczynski & Greenberg, supra note 165, at 313 (arguing that people will have asym-
metrical evidentiary requirements because "people are generally better able to make use of informa-
tion" that supports the hypothesis); Yaacov Trope & Akiva Liberman, Social Hypothesis Testing:
Cognitive and Motivational Mechanisms, in SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: HANDBOOK OF BASIC PRINCIPLES,
supra note 169, at 239, 262.
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pothesis than to reject it.228 In other words, the necessary quantity and
quality of evidence may be different. This asymmetrical evidentiary re-
quirement may result in biased decision making, in that a desired hy-
pothesis is more likely to be confirmed.229  For the decision maker, the
pleasant feelings generated by accepting a desired hypothesis would help
reduce the costs of an incorrect acceptance; likewise, unpleasant feelings
created by rejecting a desired hypothesis would increase those costs.23 ° It
is also worth noting that people may apply different evidentiary thresh-
olds because of varying cognitive processes 231' resulting from prior beliefs
and expectancies (rather than due to motivational forces). 32
The criteria used for decision making may also vary in a self-serving
manner. 2" Affected parties will often have self-serving views regarding
fair outcomes of disputes.234
b. Constructive Information Processing/Inconsistent Weighing
Decision makers will often judge information that supports their
hypothesis as more important, valid, and accurate than information
counter to their hypothesis. 35 Participants who were motivated to reach
a particular conclusion likewise weighted supporting information more
heavily.236 Interestingly, participants supported preferred alternatives
228. See Pyszczynski & Greenberg, supra note 165, at 313.
229. Asymmetrical evidentiary requirements are not per se evidence of bias. As Trope and
Liberman note, because there may be different costs associated with accepting or rejecting a desired
hypothesis, "symmetry is not the hallmark of objectivity." Trope & Liberman, supra note 227, at 264.
230. Id.
231. See supra notes 159-64 and accompanying text.
232. See, e.g., Charles G. Lord et al., Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of
Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 2098, 2098
(1979). See generally RICHARD E. NISBETr & LEE D. Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND
SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT (1980).
233. Messick & Sentiss, supra note 172, at 70-72 (finding that participants will often apply either
equity (rewards allocated in accordance with efforts or performance) or equality (rewards allocated
equally) in self-serving ways).
234. Linda Babcock et al., Biased Judgments of Fairness in Bargaining, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 1337,
1341-42 (1995) (finding that in a simulation people's assigned roles affected their view of the fairness
of a settlement and their prediction of the magnitude of a judicial award); Kimberly A. Wade-Benzoni
et al., Egocentric Interpretations of Fairness in Asymmetric, Environmental Social Dilemmas: Explain-
ing Harvesting Behavior and the Role of Communication, 67 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION
PROCESSES 111, 114 (1996) (finding self-serving biases among participants contributing to overfishing).
235. Ditto & Lopez, supra note 149, at 569; Greitemeyer & Schulz-Hardt, supra note 158, at 336
(finding "strong and stable biases in favor of the initially preferred alternative"); Russo et al., supra
note 187, at 13; J. Edward Russo et al., Predecisional Distortion of Product Information, 35 J.
MARKETING RES. 438, 439 (1998); J. Edward Russo et al., The Distortion of Information During Deci-
sions, 66 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 102, 107 (1996).
236. Lindsley G. Boiney et al., Instrumental Bias in Motivated Reasoning: More When More Is
Needed, 72 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 1, 12-14 (1997); Diekmann et al., supra note
74, at 1071-72 (finding that participants weighted criteria differently so as to justify unequal alloca-
tions); Messick & Sentiss. supra note 172, at 76-79 (observing that participants tend to believe inputs
that they provide are more important than others' inputs); see also Ziva Kunda, Motivated Inference:
Self-Serving Generation of Causal Theories, 53 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 636, 640 (1987)
(finding that subjects generated self-serving attributions regarding causes of divorce); Leigh Thomp-
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more when additional support was necessary for the alternative to be
chosen.7
Selective weighting occurs even if there is no clear motivation to
reach a particular conclusion, perhaps simply because of the motivation
to reach a conclusion. For example, Holyoak and Simon found that the
weight given to legal arguments during the decision-making process in-
creased in the direction that supported the verdict eventually reached.238
Subjects reported high confidence levels in their verdicts, even though
the sample cases were both ambiguous and complex.239 Furthermore,
they found it hard to remember their predecision assessments.240 As an-
other example, a decision maker will generally give more weight to the
input of advisors who most support the decision maker's views.24' Simon
and his colleagues concluded that the "reconstruction of preferences
seems to be the natural outcome of the very process of decision mak-
ing." '242 People do not appear likely to remember or be aware of their re-
construction of preferences.243
Irrelevant information or unjustifiable factors may also be used to
support a preferred alternative.2" Various studies have shown that a
choice between two alternatives is affected when a third choice, clearly
son & George Loewenstein, Egocentric Interpretations of Fairness and Interpersonal Conflict, 51 ORG.
BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 176, 178-79 (1992).
237. Boiney et al., supra note 236, at 12.
238. Dan Simon et al., The Emergence of Coherence over the Course of Decision Making, 27 J.
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: LEARNING, MEMORY & COGNITION 1250, 1250 (2001) (finding "that the
decision-making process was accompanied by a systematic change in the evaluation of the inferences
towards a pattern of coherence with the emerging decision"); see also Carlson & Russo, supra note
226, at 91-92 (finding distortion of evidence); Lorraine Hope et al., Understanding Pretrial Publicity:
Predecisional Distortion of Evidence by Mock Jurors, 10 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 111,
113 (2004) (finding that following exposure to a biased newspaper account of a murder, subjects
evaluated the evidence in the trial that was consistent with the pretrial publicity as more persuasive).
In a subsequent study Simon and his colleagues found that the legal decision makers' views on the evi-
dence and arguments become consistent with the emerging verdict just from merely thinking about the
case, without requiring any overt commitment to the verdict. Simon et al., supra, at 1257-58. In these
studies, if as seems likely the participants did not have particular motivations to reach one verdict or
the other, it indicates the importance of cognitive biases, or alternatively the importance of a coher-
ence motivation. See also Dan Simon et al., Construction of Preferences by Constraint Satisfaction, 15
PSYCHOL. ScI. 331, 335 (2004) [hereinafter Simon, Construction] (finding that as subjects "processed
the decision task, their preferences for the attributes of the alternative that was ultimately chosen in-
creased, while their preferences for the attributes of the to-be-rejected choice decreased").
239. Holyoak & Simon, supra note 223, at 21-23.
240. Id. at 23.
241. Nigel Harvey et al., Using Advice and Assessing Its Quality, 81 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM.
DECISION PROCESSES 252, 253 (2000).
242. See Simon, Construction, supra note 238, at 335.
243. Holyoak & Simon, supra note 223, at 23 (finding "an apparent tendency to believe that
whatever one now believes, one has always (to some degree) believed").
244. See, e.g., Christopher K. Hsee, Elastic Justification: How Tempting but Task-Irrelevant Fac-
tors Influence Decisions, 62 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 330 (1995); Christopher K.
Hsee, Elastic Justification: How Unjustifiable Factors Influence Judgments, 66 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM.
DECISION PROCESSES 122 (1996).
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inferior to one of the alternatives, is also presented.245 The presence of
the third alternative gives decision makers an additional reason to choose
the alternative to which the third alternative is clearly inferior. The
study also showed that people might engage in more biased processing
when their desired alternative is less justifiable.246 Strong evidence in fa-
vor of a particular conclusion may also affect the evaluation of the
strength of logically unrelated evidence. 247 A recent study even demon-
strated that people would distort information in order to support an infe-
rior choice.24 8
Finally, numerous studies show that a decision maker, forced to de-
cide between two or more alternatives, will often process the information
in a biased way. Decision makers will "spread" their evaluations of al-
ternatives so there is greater differentiation between them.249  As when
an irrelevant factor is used to justify a decision, the decision maker can
feel more confident about the quality of the decision.
c. Resistance to Disconfirming Information
Assuming that a decision maker finds information that is inconsis-
tent with his or her preferred conclusion or belief, the information is
more likely to be intensively scrutinized and criticized than consistent in-
formation °.2  This is part of the "well-documented resistance of opinions
against disconfirming evidence. 251
For example, in a now classic study, experimenters presented sub-
jects with two studies on the deterrent effect of capital punishment.252
The two studies reached opposite results, using either intra- or inter-state
comparisons to support the conclusions.253 Participants attacked the
methodology (i.e., sample size, sample selection, absence of controls) of
whichever study failed to support their previous beliefs on capital pun-
245. Itamar Simonson, Choice Based on Reasons: The Case of Attraction and Compromise Effects,
16 J. CONSUMER RES. 158, 160-61 (1989).
246. Id. at 161.
247. See Simon, Construction, supra note 238, at 335 ("[O]ne piece of strong evidence.., triggers
changes in the evaluation of unrelated attributes .... ").
248. J. Edward Russo et al., Choosing an Inferior Alternative, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 899,899 (2006).
249. Perhaps the simplest explanation of this is Mill's "choice certainty" theory. He argued that
because people want to make the best decision, they try to maximize their certainty that they are mak-
ing the right decision. A wider spread in evaluations helps reassure people that they are making the
correct choice. Judson Mills, Interest in Supporting and Discrepant Information, in THEORIES OF
COGNITIVE CONSISTENCY: A SOURCE BOOK 771,775-76 (Robert P. Abelson et al. eds., 1968).
250. Ditto & Lopez, supra note 149, at 581-82; Kari Edwards & Edward E. Smith, A Disconfirma-
tion Bias in the Evaluation of Arguments, 71 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5, 5 (1996); Geoffrey
D. Munro & Peter H. Ditto, Biased Assimilation, Attitude Polarization, and Affect in Reaction to
Stereotype-Relevant Scientific Information, 23 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 636, 636 (1997);
see also Jonathan J. Koehler, The Influence of Prior Beliefs on Scientific Judgments of Evidence Qual-
ity, 56 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 28 (1993).
251. Greitemeyer & Schulz-Hardt, supra note 158, at 324.
252. See Lord et al., supra note 232, at 2100.
253. Id.
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ishment, but found the supporting study to be sound.254 The contradic-
tory evidence actually resulted in people being more confident about
their initial views.255 In short, the experimenters found that participants
were more critical of scientific research that they would prefer not to be-
lieve." 6
In a more recent illustration, subjects were given a fictional medical
test for a "dangerous" enzyme deficiency.5 7 Some subjects were told a
test strip of paper would turn green if they had the deficiency, while oth-
ers were told that it would turn green if they did not have the defi-
ciency. Those who tested positive for the deficiency scrutinized the test
much more closely, waited longer for the results (here, whether a strip of
paper would turn green), and were much more likely to perform multiple
tests than those who tested negative. 59 While this response may not be
unreasonable, the subjects who tested positive also rated the disease as
much more common and much less serious than those who tested nega-
tive."6
A team of researchers found a neural basis for such differential
scrutiny.2 6' The study showed that those who strongly supported either
2004 presidential candidate were highly critical of the inconsistent state-
ments the other candidate made, and forgiving of the inconsistent state-
ments their preferred candidate made.262 These conclusions are consis-
tent with the other research cited here. The study also showed, however,
that the parts of the brain normally engaged during reasoning had no in-
crease in activity, whereas those parts linked to emotion and conflict
resolution were active.263 In addition, the brains of people rejecting un-
wanted information were active in areas associated with rewards and re-
254. Id. at 2101-03.
255. Id. at 2104.
256. Id. at 2106-07. Similar results were found in Tom Pyszczynski et al., Maintaining Consistency
Between Self-Serving Beliefs and Available Data: A Bias in Information Evaluation, 11 PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 179, 184-85 (1985). Interestingly, in a subsequent study, when experimenters
affirmed subjects' self-worth before they evaluated evidence on capital punishment that was contrary
to their beliefs, the subjects were more persuaded by that contrary evidence. See Geoffrey L. Cohen
et al., When Beliefs Yield to Evidence: Reducing Biased Evaluations by Affirming the Self, 26
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1151, 1161 (2000). The study suggests that people are moti-
vated to maintain their self-image. Id.
257. Ditto & Lopez, supra note 149, at 574-76 (experiment two).
258. Id.
259. Id. at 576.
260. Id. at 575-76.
261. See Drew Westen et al., Neural Bases of Motivated Reasoning: An fMRI Study of Emotional
Constraints on Partisan Political Judgment in the 2004 US. Presidential Election, 18 J. COGNITIVE
NEUROSCIENCE 1947, 1955 (2006) (demonstrating through functional magnetic resonance imaging that
the confirmation bias can occur at an unconscious level and is affected by emotions). Because this
study was performed only on men, it may not be generalizable to women. Id. at 1956. Given, how-
ever, that 83 percent of directors are male, it can still shed some light in the corporate context. See
supra note 105 and accompanying text.
262. Westen et al., supra note 261, at 1947-49, 1955.
263. Id. at 1955.
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lief.26 The lead researcher concluded, "Essentially, it appears as if parti-
sans twirl the cognitive kaleidoscope until they get the conclusions they
want, and then they get massively reinforced for it, with the elimination
of negative emotional states and activation of positive ones. 265
3. Memory
That memory is flawed is no surprise, certainly to anyone over the
age of thirty.266 "The human brain is built in a way that ensures our past
memories are faulty. '267  Bartlett noted more than a century ago that
memory is "not an exact event burned into the brain with exquisite accu-
racy," but rather "a social or cultural phenomenon. '26' That memory
may involve construction or reconstruction is also likely no surprise. 69
"[I]t is also necessary to remember that events happened in the desired
manner. And if it is necessary to rearrange one's memories or to tamper
with written records, then it is necessary to forget that one has done
SO.9
270
That memory can be flawed in a systematic way, however, is more
interesting. Memory, it turns out, can be affected by bias. Researchers
have produced three types of data that suggest that motivation biases
memory recall. The first type involves participants' spontaneous recall of
varying memories and beliefs depending on their motivational goal.271
For example, participants in simulated contracts negotiations were sig-
nificantly better at remembering facts supporting their assigned position
than facts supporting the other side's position.272 The second type in-
volves participants responding more quickly when the accessed memo-
ries and beliefs supported the desired goal 3.27  Finally, participants used
different statistical heuristics depending on the desired goal.27g In gen-
eral, people are more likely to remember information that supports their
views than information that does not.275
264. Id. at 1956.
265. See MSNBC.com, Political Bias Affects Brain Activity, Study Finds, http://www.msnbc.
msn.com/id/11009379/ (last visited Sept. 30,2008) (quoting Drew Westen).
266. GAZZANIGA, supra note 152, at 127 (finding half of subjects were "substantially wrong in
their memory reports" of the 1986 Challenger crash) (citation omitted).
267. Id. at 122.
268. Id. at 121 (noting that this view has much support).
269. See id. at 120 ("[Remembering is] an imaginative reconstruction, or construction, built out of
the relation of our attitude towards a whole active mass of past experience." (quoting SIR FREDERIC
C. BARTLETT, REMEMBERING: A STUDY IN EXPERIMENTAL AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 213 (1932))).
270. Chugh et al., supra note 8, at 80 (quoting GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 215 (Harcourt 1949)).
271. See Kunda, supra note 171, at 493-94 (listing examples of subjects' self-reported behaviors
and memories that supported subjects' desired self-concepts, attitudes, or beliefs) (citations omitted).
272. Thompson & Loewenstein, supra note 236, at 176.
273. Id. (citations omitted).
274. Id.
275. See, e.g., Jonathan Baron, Myside Bias in Thinking About Abortion, 7 THINKING &
REASONING 221, 221 (1995) (reporting that people remember evidence that supports their views more
readily than evidence that does not); Kunda, supra note 171 (reviewing studies). For a more recent
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If a director is motivated in favor of a fellow director or herself, she
appears more likely to remember supportive information. If she remem-
bers supportive information, she is more likely to substantiate and rely
on that information.
D. Illusion of Objectivity
Even though directors' biases can affect decision making at an un-
conscious level, it does not follow that there is necessarily a problem. If,
for example, directors, acting in good faith, were aware of their biases,
they could recuse themselves. Alternatively, if they could control or
compensate for their biases, then we could be confident that decisions
were made on the business merits rather than other factors.276
From a psychological perspective, neither alternative appears likely.
Ex ante we generally believe that we can be objective. Ex post we typi-
cally believe that we have been objective. Abundant evidence exists,
however, to show that we are often wrong. People frequently lack self-
knowledge:
Decision makers.., have no way of knowing whether their deci-
sions emanate from the biases they have acquired from personal in-
terests instead of from good reasoning .... People are incapable of
knowing whether they are acting appropriately or out of a conflict
of interest. Hence morally objectionable factors such as personal
relationships can intrude into official decisions without much possi-
bility of detection.277
We tend to think that our decisions are unbiased and our beliefs jus-
tified.278 The U.S. President captured this idea nicely when he said, "I
know what I believe and I believe what I believe is right." '279 Pyszczynski
study, see Michael J. Marks & R. Chris Fraley, Confirmation Bias and the Sexual Double Standard, 54
SEX ROLES 19,19 (2006), which found that people were more likely to remember information support-
ing their views of male and female sexuality than information that did not support their views. See
also Holyoak & Simon, supra note 223, at 4 (showing that consistently increasing "shifts in beliefs and
attitudes trigger correlated shifts in memory"). But see Alice H. Eagly et al., The Impact of Attitudes
on Memory: An Affair to Remember, 125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 64, 66 (1999) (finding evidence that subjects
were just as likely to remember information inconsistent with their personal beliefs as consistent in-
formation); Allyson L. Holbrook et al., Attitude Importance and the Accumulation of Attitude-Relevant
Knowledge in Memory, 88 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 749,766 (2005) (same).
276. Veronika Denes-Raj & Seymour Epstein, Conflict Between Intuitive and Rational Processing:
When People Behave Against Their Better Judgment, 66 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 819, 819
(1994) (arguing that "humans can respond rationally (in the sense of engaging their deliberative, ra-
tional system in an objective, unbiased manner) only to the degree to which they are aware of and can
therefore compensate for their experientially influenced thoughts and response tendencies").
277. Thagard, supra note 92, at 373-74.
278. Dan Simon, A Third View of the Black Box: Cognitive Coherence in Legal Decision Making,
71 U. CHI. L. REV. 511, 545 (2004) (referring to the "robust body of literature demonstrating that peo-
ple have a general tendency to perceive objectivity in their reasoning processes").
279. See Washington Week with Gwen Ifill (PBS television broadcast July 27, 2001), transcript
available at http://www.pbs.org/wetalwashingtonweek/transcripts/transcriptOlO727.html (quoting
George W. Bush). The aphorism commonly attributed to Mark Twain is equally applicable: "It ain't
what you don't know that gets you into trouble. It's what you know for sure that just ain't so."
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and Greenberg referred to this as an "illusion of objectivity. 280 As they
put it, "[I]n order to best meet one's needs, people seek to maintain an
illusion of objectivity concerning the manner in which their beliefs and
inferences are formed. 28'
There are several reasons for this "bias blind spot"2 or "illusion of
objectivity. 2 3  First, we have a self-enhancement bias: we are generally
motivated to view ourselves in a positive light.2 4 If we are competent
and moral, then we think we should be able to make unbiased deci-
sions.285 We also tend to think that we are better than others at making
such decisions. Second, we think we see the world as it actually is, and
those who do not see it the way we do are biased8 6 Third, we believe
that we have access to our own decision-making processes, so we know
what caused us to reach a particular decision.27 Each of these reasons
may involve some level of self-deception. 2' Finally, some evidence exists
that people cannot control their biases, even when they are aware of
them.289
1. Competence
"And why beholdest thou the mote that is in thy brother's eye, but
considerest not the beam that is in thine own eye?"29
As the biblical quote suggests, we are often good at perceiving the
faults of others, and not as good at perceiving our own.291 It is often easy
BrainyQuote, Mark Twain Quotes, http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/authors/m/mark-twain.html
(last visited Nov. 13, 2008).
280. Pyszczynski & Greenberg, supra note 165, at 302 (arguing that when motives influence
judgment "they do so in ways that enable one to maintain an illusion of objectivity concerning the
manner in which these inferences were derived. To maintain such an illusion, the perceiver must con-
trol the information that he or she brings to bear on the inference in question.").
281. Id. at 317.
282. See Pronin et al., supra note 14, at 369-70.
283. Pyszczynski & Greenberg, supra note 165, at 302.
284. Joachim Krueger & Richard A. Mueller, Unskilled, Unaware, or Both? The Better-than-
A verage Heuristic and Statistical Regression Predict Errors in Estimates of Own Performance, 82 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 180, 186-87 (2002) (finding that self-enhancement bias can benefit
the perceiver more often than not); Kerr et al., supra note 195, at 687 (noting that people show consis-
tent biases in judgment, stemming in part from self-enhancing motives).
285. Chugh et al., supra note 8, at 84 ("In a conflict of interest, competence is often viewed as suf-
ficient for avoiding suboptimal decision-making.").
286. Id. at 81.
287. Id. at 87-90 (discussing invisible conflicts of interest).
288. See Anne E. Tenbrunsel & David M. Messick, Ethical Fading: The Role of Self-Deception in
Unethical Behavior, 17 Soc. JusT. RES. 223, 225 (2004) ("[Self deception] is common, normal, and ac-
cepted as constant and pervasive in individuals' lives. We are creative narrators of stories that tend to
allow us to do what we want and that justify what we have done. We believe our stories and thus be-
lieve that we are objective about ourselves."); Thagard, supra note 92, at 375 ("The reason that people
frequently succumb to self-deception is that belief acceptance is determined not just by coherence with
other beliefs including the relevant evidence, but also by emotional attachments to personal goals such
as maintaining self esteem.").
289. See infra Part IV.D.4.
290. Pronin et al., supra note 142, at 781 (quoting Matthew 7:3 (King James)).
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to see how others may be biased,2" especially after one is informed of
cognitive and perceptual biases.293 (Imagine a lawsuit against you: would
you want the plaintiff's friend or someone who receives money from the
plaintiff deciding whether the case should proceed?)294 It is much harder
to recognize one's own biases.295
The simple fact is "most of us believe that we are capable and im-
partial decision-makers."296 In numerous areas of human endeavor more
people claim to be above average than is statistically possible, or other-
wise overestimate their own abilities."9 Claims of ethicality (either of not
being affected by one's own interests, or being able to make a decision
on the merits regardless of them) are no different.298 Not only are we ca-
291. Pronin et al., supra note 142, at 785-88 (reviewing extensive evidence of people's views of
others as more likely to be biased than themselves).
292. See, e.g., Diekmann, supra note 74, at 1073 (finding that participants believed that other par-
ticipants would show greater ingroup bias than they would); Joachim I. Krueger, Enhancement Bias in
Descriptions of Self and Others, 24 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 505, 513-15 (1998); Dale T.
Miller & Rebecca K. Ratner, The Disparity Between the Actual and Assumed Power of Self-Interest, 74
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 53, 60 (1998) (finding that subjects both deny the impact of self-
interest on their own decision making and overestimate the impact of self-interest on others).
293. See Linda Babcock et al., supra note 234, at 1337 (finding that even when informed of cogni-
tive and perceptual biases, most people believe that others have such biases but that they do not);
James Friedrich, On Seeing Oneself as Less Self-Serving than Others: The Ultimate Self-Serving Bias?,
23 TEACHING OF PSYCHOL. 107, 108-09 (1996) (finding that subjects believe themselves less suscepti-
ble to bias than others, even after learning of the better-than-average bias); Pronin et al., supra note
14, at 369 (finding that subjects overwhelmingly believed that they were much less likely to have cogni-
tive and motivational biases than the average person, even after researchers described the bias
whereby people see themselves as better than average).
294. Fortunately, it appears as though the special litigation context is "the 'only instance in
American Jurisprudence where a defendant can free itself from a suit by merely appointing a commit-
tee to review the allegations of the complaint."' Einhorn v. Culea, 612 N.W.2d 78, 91 (Wis. 2000)
(quoting Lewis v. Fuqua, 502 A.2d 962, 967 (Del. Ch. 1985)).
295. Trope & Liberman, supra note 227, at 264 ("It is difficult to tell whether people -including
ourselves-are objective.").
296. See Bond et al., supra note 154, at 240; see also Chugh et al., supra note 8, at 84 (noting that
"individuals who are paid to make sound decisions are unlikely to doubt their own competence in do-
ing so").
297. See Justin Kruger, Lake Wobegon Be Gone! The "Below-Average Effect" and the Egocentric
Nature of Comparative Ability Judgments, 77 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 221, 221 (1999) (con-
cluding that "most of us appear to believe that we are more athletic, intelligent, organized, ethical,
logical, interesting, fair-minded, and healthy-not to mention more attractive-than the average per-
son"); Justin Kruger & David Dunning, Unskilled and Unaware of It: How Difficulties in Recognizing
One's Own Incompetence Lead to Inflated Self-Assessments, 77 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
1121, 1121 (1999) (reporting on many studies showing that people overestimate their abilities); see also
Nicholas Epley & David Dunning, Feeling "Holier than Thou": Are Self-Serving Assessments Produced
by Errors in Self- or Social Prediction?, 79 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 861, 861 (2000) (more
virtuous); Michael McCall & Katherine Nattrass, Carding for the Purchase of Alcohol: I'm Tougher
than the Other Clerks Are!, 31 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 2184, 2184 (2001) (more principled); Don A.
Moore et al., Positive Illusions and Forecasting Errors in Mutual Fund Investment Decisions, 79 ORG.
BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 95, 110-12 (1999) (investing); Janet Polivy & C. Peter Herman,
If at First You Don't Succeed: False Hopes of Self Change, 57 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 677, 677 (2002)
(overestimates of one's own performance).
298. See W.B.G. Liebrand et al., Why We Are Fairer than Others: A Cross-Cultural Replication
and Extension, 22 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 590, 591 (1986); David M. Messick et al., Why We
Are Fairer than Others, 21 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 480,481 (1985).
No. 11
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
pable and impartial, we are more capable and impartial than others.299
Similarly, we also believe ourselves to be less biased by irrelevant or in-
appropriate information than our peers.
300
Dolly Chugh and colleagues develop this idea:
Ethical decisions are biased by a stubborn view of oneself as moral,
competent, and deserving, and thus, not susceptible to conflicts of
interest. To the self, a view of morality ensures that the decision
maker resists temptations for unfair gain [and] a view of compe-
tence ensures that the decision maker qualifies for the role at
hand ....
2. Naive Realism
Reasonable people accept that their decisions are suspect if they
were based on biased information searches or biased evaluation of the
evidence. Typically, however, people are confident in their own deci-
sions.3 °2 People are "na've realists" who tend not to "fully appreciate the
subjective status of their own construals."3 3 The naive realism illusion
results from "the individual's conviction that he or she perceives reality
objectively and that reality will be similarly perceived by those who share
that objectivity."3" We are the objective reasonable person, "privy to an
invariant, knowable, objective reality," and others would see this too, if
only they were not self-interested or otherwise biased. When others
have a different point of view, such as whether a derivative suit should go
299. Moore & Loewenstein, supra note 98, at 195-96 (explaining that people like to believe not
only that they are better than they actually are but also better than others); Pronin & Kugler, supra
note 136, at 576 (showing that participants were "overly prone to deny their own bias").
300. Timothy D. Wilson & Nancy Brekke, Mental Contamination and Mental Correction: Un-
wanted Influences on Judgments and Evaluations, 116 PSYCHOL. BULL. 117,125 (1994).
301. Chugh et al., supra note 8, at 84.
302. See, e.g., Holyoak & Simon, supra note 223, at 21 (reporting that participants showed a great
deal of confidence in their verdict for a simulated case despite the ambiguity of the case); Russo et al.,
supra note 248, at 903 (finding that decision makers were equally confident in their choices regardless
of whether they chose the inferior or superior option).
303. Robert J. Robinson et al., Actual Versus Assumed Differences in Construal: "Naive Realism"
in Intergroup Perception and Conflict, 68 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 404, 404 (1995) (finding
that both pro-choice and pro-life subjects believed that the other side's beliefs and assumptions were
shaped more by political ideology and less by objective or rational concerns than their own views and
assumptions). Naive realism also implies that people fail to allow for the subjective construal of others
when judging a person's behavior as well. Id. (referring to the "blindness to intersubjective differences
in construal").
304. Id. at 413.
305. Id. at 405; see also Justin Kruger & Thomas Gilovich, "Naive Cynicism" in Everyday Theo-
ries of Responsibility Assessment: On Biased Assumptions of Bias, 76 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 743, 743-44 (1999). We also think we have better interpersonal knowledge about others
than they have about us. See Emily Pronin et al., You Don't Know Me, but I Know You: The Illusion
of Asymmetric Insight, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 639, 650-52 (2001). We may even think
that we not only know ourselves better than others do, but better than our peers know themselves. Id.
at 645.
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forward, it is those others who are not only mistaken, but often biased as
well.3°6
3. Introspection
Not surprisingly, people generally believe that their decisions result
from conscious thought, or alternatively, that simply thinking about why
one made a decision will uncover the reasons. 7 After all, we have ex-
tensive, privileged access to our own conscious thoughts, emotions, and
motives. We also tend to weigh our own introspective evaluations more
highly in evaluating bias than the introspections of others.3 °s Research-
ers, however, have demonstrated this privileged access can lead our
judgments astray in many situations," including whether our judgments
were biased.310
In fact, people do not necessarily know why they have reached a
particular decision.311 As described above, decisions can result from un-
conscious mental processes. Not only are people unaware of these proc-
esses, but our conscious access to them is very limited.312 The mind can
be thought of as a wizard, producing appearances that do not necessarily
reflect underlying reality.t 3 "[Though the mind] leads us to think that it
306. See, e.g., Geoffrey L. Cohen, Party over Policy. The Dominating Impact of Group Influence
on Political Beliefs, 85 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 808 (2003); Cynthia M. Frantz, I Am Being
Fair: The Bias Blind Spot as a Stumbling Block to Seeing Both Sides, 28 BASIC & APPLIED SOC.
PSYCHOL. 157 (2006); Pronin et al., supra note 305, at 640 (arguing that we perceive bias in others
partly because of naive realism); Glenn D. Reeder et al., On Attributing Negative Motives to Others
Who Disagree with Our Opinions, 31 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1498 (2005).
307. For a general discussion of this point, see Antony Page, Batson's Blind-Spot: Unconscious
Stereotyping and the Peremptory Challenge, 85 B.U. L. REV. 155, 229-35 (2005).
308. Pronin & Kugler, supra note 136, at 575-76.
309. Daniel T. Gilbert et al., The Peculiar Longevity of Things Not So Bad, 15 PSYCHOL. SC. 14,
16-18 (2004) (emotions); Justin Kruger & Thomas Gilovich, Actions, Intentions, and Self Assessment:
The Road to Self-Enhancement Is Paved with Good Intentions, 30 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
BULL. 328, 334 (2004) (future behavior); Emily Pronin et al., Everyday Magical Powers: The Role of
Apparent Causation in the Overestimation of Personal Influence, 91 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
218, 220 (2006) (causation); Daniel M. Wegner et al., Vicarious Agency: Experiencing Control over the
Movements of Others, 86 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 838, 839-40 (2004) (causation); Timothy
D. Wilson & Elizabeth W. Dunn, Self-Knowledge: Its Limits, Value and Potential for Improvement, 55
ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 493, 502-03 (2004) (attitudes); Timothy D. Wilson & Daniel T. Gilbert, Affective
Forecasting, 35 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 345, 347-49 (2003) (emotions).
310. See Joyce Ehrlinger et al., Peering into the Bias Blind Spot: People's Assessments of Bias in
Themselves and Others, 31 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 680, 681, 683, 689-90 (2005);
Kruger & Dunning, supra note 297, at 1121 (arguing that subjects overestimated their performance
relative to others because they lacked insight into their weaknesses); Pronin et al., supra note 142, at
794; Pronin & Kugler, supra note 136, at 572-73.
311. See, e.g., GAZZANIGA, supra note 152, at 161 ("We quickly lose insight into [our beliefs'] ori-
gins or their frequent strangeness and hold them to be meaningful, guiding presences in our lives.").
312. See Balcetis & Dunning, supra note 217, at 623 (finding that people fail to recognize certain
self-serving biases because they take place outside conscious awareness).
313. See DANIEL M. WEGNER, THE ILLUSION OF CONSCIOUS WILL 28 (2002).
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causes its own actions... it really doesn't know what causes its own ac-
tions." '314
Frequently (and inevitably), we are ignorant of the mental proc-
esses that led to a particular result."5 There is, however, ample evidence
that factors we either cannot or will not recognize affect the decisions we
reach.316 Decision making in conflict of interest situations may result not
from conscious reasoning but instead as a post hoc rationalization.317
More than thirty years ago, Paul Slovic and colleagues demonstrated in
an experimental setting that stockbrokers frequently failed to understand
how they reached their investment decisions.318
A more prosaic example dates back more than seventy years. Re-
searchers hung two ropes from a ceiling at greater than arms-width.3 9
The problem was to attach the two ropes together. Most participants did
not think of swinging a rope as a way to bring them close enough to-
gether until a researcher "accidentally" brushed against one of the ropes
thereby setting it in motion.32° Subjects, however, failed to recognize
what had cued them towards that solution. Rather, they invented other
explanations.321
Part of the difficulty is termed "source confusion": "the inability to
recognize the exact contribution of all of the influences on one's judg-
ments." '322 People make decisions based on numerous sources of infor-
mation but have difficulty determining what information led to their
314. ld.; see also BENEDiCTUS DE SPINOZA, ETHics 144 (G.H.R. Parkinson ed. & trans., 2000)
(1677) (claiming that "opinion... consists simply in the fact that they are conscious of their actions
and ignorant of the causes by which those actions are determined"). Spinoza's observation is reflected
in everyday notions of folk psychology. Thagard, supra note 92, at 379 (observing that "[f]olk psy-
chology [assumes] that people's actions derive from their conscious beliefs and actions"). Folk psy-
chology is defined as the "common-sense conceptual framework that we, as human beings, employ to
understand, predict, and explain the behavior of other humans and higher animals." Dictionary of
Philosophy of Mind, http://philosophy.uwaterloo.ca/MindDictfolkpsychology.html (last visited Nov.
14, 2008).
315. Tenbrunsel & Messick, supra note 288, at 225 (arguing that self-deception, "defined as being
unaware of the processes that lead us to form our opinions and judgments," results in unethical deci-
sion making).
316. See Bond et al., supra note 154, at 240 ("[A]n abundant body of research has shown that our
decisions are affected by a variety of factors that we are unable or unwilling to recognize."); Thagard,
supra note 92, at 374 ("People naturally have personal goals that may conflict with their professional
responsibilities, but lack a mental mechanism to detect such divergences .... Hence people usually
remain unaware that they are acting immorally as the result of a conflict of interest.").
317. Haidt, supra note 151, at 814 (suggesting that "moral reasoning does not cause moral judg-
ment; rather, moral reasoning is usually a post-hoc construction, generated after a judgment has been
reached").
318. Paul D. Slovic et al., Analyzing the Use of Information in Investment Decision Making: A
Methodological Proposal, 45 J. Bus. 283, 300 (1972).
319. Norman R.F. Maier, Reasoning in Humans: I. The Solution of a Problem and Its Appearance
in Consciousness, 12 J. COMP. PSYCHOL. 181,182 (1931).
320. Id. at 183.
321. Id. at 186.
322. Wilson & Brekke, supra note 300, at 129.
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overall judgment.323 One example of this is the halo effect, whereby a
decision maker's judgment of a person's performance is affected by his
liking of the person.324 Another example, recognized by the courts, in-
volves police lineups.325 Eye-witnesses must not be shown photographs
of suspects before a lineup in case they confuse seeing the photograph
with seeing the perpetrator.326
In short, directors acting in good faith will know that they intended
to be unbiased and did not feel any influences of bias; therefore, they
conclude there was no bias. Even though we think we are processing in-
formation objectively, frequently we are just unaware of how our infor-
mation processing actually is biased.327
4. Weak Control
Biases and biased information processing would matter much less if,
as people tend to think, we could control our biases. There is evidence,
however, that we cannot control them. People not only "underestimate
their own susceptibility to bias" but also "overestimate the extent to
which they can control their judgments. '32 8
Wilson and Brekke refer to a judgment where the decision maker is
influenced in an undesired way "because of mental processing that is un-
conscious or uncontrollable" as "mental contamination. 3 29 For example,
researchers have shown that information affects people's judgment, even
when they know the information should not be used or is inaccurate.330
323. Richard E. Nisbett & Timothy D. Wilson, Telling More than We Can Know: Verbal Reports
on Mental Processes, 84 PSYCHOL. REV. 231, 233 (1977); see also Timothy D. Wilson et al., Introspec-
tion, Attitude Change, and Attitude-Behavior Consistency: The Disruptive Effects of Explaining Why
We Feel the Way We Do, in 19 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 123 (Leonard
Berkowitz ed., 1986).
324. Richard E. Nisbett & Timothy DeCamp Wilson, The Halo Effect: Evidence for Unconscious
Alteration of Judgments, 35 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 250,250 (1977).
325. See, e.g., Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 382-83 (1968).
326. See Gary L. Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification Procedures: Recommendations for Lineups
and Photospreads, 22 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 603, 610, 612 (1998).
327. Ap Dijksterhuis & Loran F. Nordgren, A Theory of Unconscious Thought, 1 PERSP. ON
PSYCHOL. SCI. 95, 98 (2006) ("It may feel as if one is processing information with the goal of making a
decision when what one really-unknowingly-is doing is processing information with the goal of con-
firming an expectancy.").
328. Wilson & Brekke, supra note 300, at 126.
329. Id. at 119.
330. Colin Camerer et al., The Curse of Knowledge in Economic Settings: An Experimental Analy-
sis, 97 J. POL. ECON. 1232, 1232 (1989); Lee Ross et al., Perseverance in Self-Perception and Social Per-
ception: Biased Attributional Processes in the Debriefing Paradigm, 32 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 880, 880, 891 (1975) (finding that subjects continued to use information even when told ex-
pressly that the information was inaccurate); Daniel M. Wegner et al., The Transparency of Denial:
Briefing in the Debriefing Paradigm, 49 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 338, 344 (1985) (same);
Robert S. Wyer, Jr. & Thomas Lee Budesheim, Person Memory and Judgments: The Impact of Infor-
mation that One Is Told to Disregard, 53 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 14, 14, 28 (1987) (same);
Robert S. Wyer, Jr. & William H. Unverzagt, Effects of Instructions to Disregard Information on Its
Subsequent Recall and Use in Making Judgments, 48 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 533, 533 (1985)
(same). See generally Wilson & Brekke, supra note 300.
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"Anchoring" is a well known illustration of this predecision bias.
People will often "make estimates by starting from an initial value that is
adjusted to yield the final answer."33  We are drawn toward numbers
previously listed, even when we consciously know these numbers are ir-
relevant or absurd, and then our adjustments are frequently inadequate.
For example, students provided higher estimates of textbook prices if
they were first asked whether the average textbook price exceeded
$7,128.53,332 and participants estimated a higher average annual tempera-
ture in San Francisco if they were first asked whether the temperature
exceeded 558 degrees.333
In another study, although subjects reported they would not want
gender to influence their hiring decision, they also overwhelmingly indi-
cated that they would want to know the gender of an applicant.334 Not-
withstanding subjects' intentions, knowing the gender of the applicant
then biased the decision making.335
Another experiment showed that subjects asked to choose informa-
tion categorized as either uncertain, true, or false, deliberately chose in-
formation from each category, presumably acting under the assumption
that they would be able to keep the different types of information clear
in their minds.336 People, however, could not always retain these clear
distinctions.337 Overall, Wilson and Brekke are "rather pessimistic" that
mental contamination can be avoided or corrected.338
E. Limitations
Notwithstanding the vast body of research on unconscious proc-
esses, only some of which is analyzed above, it is worth re-emphasizing a
limitation. Most importantly, we do not have the unfettered ability to ar-
rive at our desired conclusions. People are not "at liberty to conclude
331. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185
Sci. 1124,1128 (1974).
332. Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 788-89 (2001) (citing
an unpublished study described in SCorr PLOus, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION
MAKING 146 (1993)).
333. Id.
334. Wilson & Brekke, supra note 300, at 125-26.
335. Id. In the judicial context, the rules of evidence provide that juries may not hear certain
kinds of information in part so that they will not be prejudiced unfairly.
336. Id. at 128 (citing Daniel M. Wegner et al., From Here to Uncertainty: Selective Exposure to
Misleading Information, Paper Presented at the 100th Annual Convention of the American Psycho-
logical Association (Aug. 1992)).
337. See Norbert Schwarz et al., Metacognitive Experiences and the Intricacies of Setting People
Straight: Implications for Debiasing and Public Information Campaigns, 39 ADVANCES IN
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 127. 147-52 (2007) (describing studies showing that familiar state-
ments are more likely to be believed, even when the familiar statements are incorrect).
338. Wilson & Brekke, supra note 300, at 120. Wilson & Brekke list a series of steps that must
occur in order to correct an unwanted bias. The decision maker must be aware of the unwanted men-
tal processing and able to adjust the response. Id. at 119. "People are unaware of many of their cogni-
tive processes, mental contamination often has no observable 'symptoms,' and people have limited
control over their cognitive processes." Id. at 122.
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whatever they want to conclude merely because they want to." '339 Rather,
our decisions must be supportable at some level.3" If no reasonable per-
son could reach our desired conclusion, it is much less likely that we will
be able to reach it. We can, in fact, only be "unreasonable within rea-
son.
,, 41
Thus, if a decision is truly clear-cut, a board appears likely to do the
right thing, regardless of preferences otherwise. Most decisions, how-
ever, especially those that are more complex, will be more ambiguous.342
Directors with a preferred conclusion, whether or not they are con-
sciously aware of it, are likely to be able to find at least some support for
their conclusion.
V. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
If it is true that "parties with an interest in viewing data in a certain
light are not capable of independent and objective judgment, 3 43 the
question remains, how should this be solved? One might argue that an
involved collegial board is better than the alternatives and thus nothing
should be done.3 " Or similarly, that the American model of corporate
governance has yielded unprecedented prosperity and thus should not be
changed.3 45 After all, it is only in a relatively few areas that significant di-
rector shareholder conflicts of interest are likely. But just because some-
thing is good does not mean that it cannot be made better. It does, how-
ever, suggest that caution is appropriate.
If a problem is a lack of conscious awareness, as examples including
doctors, lawyers, investment bankers, and accounting firms suggest,346 the
339. Kunda, supra note 171, at 482-83.
340. Id. at 483 ("The biasing role of goals is thus constrained by one's ability to construct a justifi-
cation for the desired conclusion: People will come to believe what they want to believe only to the
extent that reason permits. Often they will be forced to acknowledge and accept undesirable conclu-
sions, as they appear to when confronted with strong arguments for undesired or counterattitudinal
positions.") (citation omitted).
341. Ronald Chen & Jan Hanson, Categorically Biased: The Influence of Knowledge Structures on
Law and Legal Theory, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 1103, 1203 (2004).
342. See, e.g., Hollinger Int'l, Inc. v. Black, 844 A.2d 1022, 1022 (Del. Ch. 2004) ("[T]he most in-
teresting corporate law cases involve the color gray, with contending parties dueling over close ques-
tions of law, in circumstances when it is possible for each of the contestants to claim she was acting in
good faith.").
343. Max H. Bazerman & Deepak Malhotra, Economics Wins, Psychology Loses, and Society
Pays, in SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AND ECONOMICS 263,267 (David De Cremer et al. eds., 2006) (empha-
sis added) (citing to Moore et al., supra note 174).
344. See supra notes 65-70 and accompanying text.
345. See, e.g., Martin Lipton & Paul K. Rowe, The Inconvenient Truth About Corporate Govern-
ance: Some Thoughts on Vice-Chancellor Strine's Essay, 33 J. CORP. L. 63, 63 (2007) (arguing that the
"director-centric governance system has created the most successful economy the world has ever
seen").
346. See sources cited supra note 174; see also MAX H. BAZERMAN & MICHAEL D. WATKINS,
PREDICTABLE SURPRISES: THE DISASTERS YOU SHOULD HAVE SEEN COMING AND HOW TO
PREVENT THEM (2004) (arguing that recent financial scandals were caused in significant part by audi-
tors' lack of independence).
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solution cannot be based on conscious cost-benefit analysis. Thus, the
problem, contrary to the view of the Delaware courts,347 cannot be solved
based on the reputation impact, the threat of civil or criminal prosecu-
tion, or any other measure intended to alter the decision maker's per-
ceived cost-benefit function. Quite simply, "[p]enalties for unethical be-
havior are not enough if people do not know they are acting
unethically.""34 Rather, if bias affects a decision, even when it is not de-
sired by the decision maker, solutions must address "the psychological
aspects of the conflict.
349
Broadly speaking, there are several different approaches. In the
next Sections, the Article briefly highlights potential solutions35 ° that
could be implemented based on changes in the law, changes in the deci-
sion maker, or more modestly, changes in decision-making procedures.'
A. Increased Judicial Scrutiny
There are several potential legal responses to the problem of the
nonindependent director. Perhaps the most obvious of these is a more
searching scrutiny of independence.
A well-respected judge, Vice Chancellor Leo Strine of the Dela-
ware Chancery Court, addressed the independence of the two directors
serving on an SLC for Oracle Corporation.352 In re Oracle involved de-
rivative suits alleging insider trading by several of Oracle's executives
and a breach of the remaining directors' duty of care.353
The board chose for the SLC two recently recruited directors, pro-
fessors at Stanford University, who had not been members of the board
during the period at issue.354 Neither professor had been specially com-
pensated by Oracle, nor did either professor, in their personal view or
the view of the board, possess any "material ties" with Oracle or any of
the defendants.355 The two professors hired independent advisors, con-
347. See supra note 57.
348. Bazerman & Malhotra, supra note 343, at 268 (arguing that an auditor can be truly inde-
pendent only if he has no motivation at all to please the client).
349. Id.; see also Tenbrunsel & Messick, supra note 288, at 223 (arguing that the most promising
explanation of and remedy for questionable corporate practices are "the psychological processes be-
hind unethical decision making").
350. A subsequent article will explore in-depth how boards of directors in some situations could
and should alter their decision-making and deliberation processes to better ensure unbiased decisions
and to more clearly satisfy the duty of loyalty.
351. There are numerous proposals for corporate governance reform. See generally Ira M. Mill-
stein & Paul W. MacAvoy, Proposals for Reform of Corporate Governance, in THE RECURRENT
CRISIS IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 95, 119 (2003). The following merely addresses those most rele-
vant to the problem of unconscious bias discussed here.
352. In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917,920 (Del. Ch. 2003).
353. Id. at 922-23.
354. Id. at 923-24.
355. Id. at 929.
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ducted an extensive investigation, produced a 1,110-page report, and
concluded there had been no wrongdoing."6
Plaintiffs challenged the SLC's independence on the grounds that
several of the defendants had ties to Stanford University.35 7 Notwith-
standing these ties, the court acknowledged that neither professor was
financially compromised or was at risk of any job action.358 Further, the
court accepted that there was nothing in the record to suggest that either
SLC member "acted out of any conscious desire ... to do anything other
than discharge their duties with fidelity" or was "dominated and con-
trolled by any of the [other defendants], by Oracle, or even by Stan-
ford. 35
9
Nonetheless, Vice Chancellor Strine found that the SLC directors
were not independent, due to "what academics might call the 'thickness'
of the social and institutional connections among" the SLC members and
the other parties.3' The judge believed that "an emphasis on 'domina-
tion and control' would ... denud[e] the independence inquiry of its in-
tellectual integrity." '361 Instead, the judge chose to apply his own stan-
dard: "'At bottom, the question of independence turns on whether a
director is, for any substantial reason, incapable of making a decision
with only the best interests of the corporation in mind.' 362 Even though
the SLC members were neither dominated nor controlled, there was "too
much vivid Stanford Cardinal red," or potential collegiality and loyalty,
creating too great a risk of bias.363
In re Oracle broke new ground, in that previously any director with
the sorts of ties that the Oracle SLC members had would have been
found independent. Professional affiliations and (extremely) indirect fi-
nancial ties had never before been sufficient to find a director not inde-
pendent.3" Specifically, Strine went beyond the traditional standard that
director independence equals financial disinterest, and instead put some
teeth into the touchstone phrase "extraneous considerations or influ-
ences."365 Put somewhat differently, Strine recognized that people may
be improperly moved by more than just money and close family ties and
may be unable to control or counteract those influences.366
356. Id. at 926-27.
357. One or more of the defendants had made donations to Stanford, held Stanford degrees, or
was a professor at Stanford. In addition, two directors and one of the SLC directors were involved
with the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research. Id. at 930-36.
358. Id. at 930.
359. Id. at 937, 947 (emphasis added).
360. Id. at 936.
361. Id. at 937.
362. Id. at 938 (quoting Parfi Holding AB v. Mirror Image Internet, 794 A.2d 1211, 1232 (Del. Ch.
2001)).
363. Id. at 947.
364. Strine conceded that the result was "in tension with the specific outcomes of certain other
decisions." Id. at 939 n.55.
365. See supra notes 37-51 and accompanying text.
366. Oracle, 824 A.2d at 939 n.55.
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This more stringent approach to independence had been foreshad-
owed by a report on Enron prepared by a United States Senate subcom-
mittee."' This report had concluded that a lack of board independence
was in fact one of the causes of the Enron bankruptcy, even though En-
ron had a majority of "independent" directors based on the traditional
definition. 68 The report noted in detail the indirect financial ties be-
tween Enron and a majority of the outside directors, which included
similar ties to those listed in In re Oracle.369 The report noted that "a
number of corporate governance experts ... identified these [and other]
financial ties as contributing to the Enron board's lack of independence
and reluctance to challenge Enron management. "370
An alternative legal approach to a more stringent definition of an
independent director would be to impose a more searching standard of
review in those situations that are most vulnerable to conflicts of inter-
est.371 Unocal is just such an intermediate standard applied to a board's
defensive measures to reduce the likelihood of a takeover.372 The court
reasoned that in the takeover context there was "the omnipresent specter
that a board may be acting primarily in its own interests, rather than
those of the corporation and its shareholders," justifying a higher stan-
dard.373 Unocal's effectiveness is questionable, however, judging from
the Delaware Supreme Court's decisions. To date, in more than twenty
years, only one case, Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc.,374 found a
367. See ENRON REPORT, supra note 115, at 54; see also Rachel A. Fink, Social Ties in the Board-
room: Changing the Definition of Director Independence to Eliminate "Rubber-Stamping" Boards, 79
S. CAL. L. REV. 455,491-94 (2006) (proposing firms be required to hire board-rating agencies to evalu-
ate the social ties among directors and that those whose ties are too strong should be ineligible to serve
as independent directors).
368. See ENRON REPORT, supra note 115, at 54.
369. Ties between Enron and its independent directors included generous donations to the
Anderson Cancer Center, for which two board members had served as president; to George Mason
University, the employer of another board member; and to the American Council for Capital Forma-
tion, a nonprofit corporation chaired by a fourth director. See id. at 55-56.
370. Id. at 56.
371. See James D. Cox, Searching for the Corporation's Voice in Derivative Suit Litigation: A Cri-
tique of Zapata and the ALI Project, 1982 DUKE L.J. 959, 1008 (arguing in favor of more active judicial
review); Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Disney, Good Faith, and Structural Bias, 32 J. CORP. L.
833, 834 (2007) (proposing an extension of the doctrine of good faith when the challenged decision
occurred "within an environment of structural bias"); Velasco, supra note 70, at 860-65 (arguing in
favor of an intermediate standard of review between the deferential business judgment rule and the
entire fairness standard for director decisions in areas where structural bias is most likely to have an
impact).
372. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954-55 (Del. 1985) (holding that to sus-
tain anti-takeover measures, "directors must show that they had reasonable grounds for believing that
a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed" and that the measures adopted were "reason-
able in relation to the threat posed"). Blasius applies an even higher standard analogous to strict scru-
tiny in situations where the directors have acted with the primary motive of interfering with the share-
holder franchise-a situation likely to pose a conflict of interest. See Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas
Corp., 564 A.2d 651,661 (Del. Ch. 1988).
373. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954.
374. 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003).
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violation of Unocal, and that case involved very unusual facts.375 In addi-
tion, Omnicare has faced unusually harsh criticism."'
Increasing judicial scrutiny, however, is not necessarily a panacea.377
It has costs. First, "it is easier to accuse someone of bias then [sic] to ac-
tually establish that a judgment is in fact biased." '378 In addition, "it is al-
ways possible that the bias lies in the accuser rather than (or in addition
to) the accused." '379 Judge Posner observed that judicial review of corpo-
rate decisions "makes directors overcautious, makes people reluctant to
serve as directors, drives up directors' fees and officers' and directors' li-
ability insurance rates, and leads boards of directors to adopt ponderous,
court-like procedures."'3 8'
B. Different Decision Makers
If serving on a board inherently creates the risk of a biased decision
maker, then changing the decision maker remains a possible solution.
The corporation's shareholders are an obvious candidate. Currently,
shareholders have the right to vote on matters like the election of direc-
tors and the appointment of auditors, but have little real power.381
Bebchuk and Fried argue in favor of allowing more shareholder partici-
pation in the election of directors and in executive compensation.382 For
example, the "say-on-pay" initiative, if enacted, would allow sharehold-
ers a mandatory, albeit nonbinding, vote on executive compensation.383
Thompson and Thomas suggest a variation on this alternative with their
proposal that 1 percent or greater shareholders should be permitted to
bring derivative litigation without first making demand on the board."8
375. Id. at 946 (Veasey, C.J., dissenting) (describing the case as "sui generis" and the facts as
"unique").
376. See, e.g., In re Toys "R" Us, Inc., 877 A.2d 975, 1016 n.68 (Del. Ch. 2005) (referring to Om-
nicare as "aberrational"); David Marcus, Man of Steele, D&O ADVISOR, Sept. 2004, at 16, 16 (quoting
Delaware Supreme Court Chief Justice Steele suggesting that Omnicare might have the "life expec-
tancy of a fruit fly").
377. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57
VAND. L. REV. 83, 107-09, 117-24 (2004) (describing problems with judicial review of directors' deci-
sions).
378. MacCoun, supra note 137, at 263.
379. Id. Naive realism, for example, discussed supra in Part IV.D.2, may "lead people to treat the
viewpoints held and expressed by those who disagree with them about important ... issues as evidence
of subjective bias on the part of those opponents, bias not only in proceeding from evidence to conclu-
sions but also in construing the evidence itself." Robinson, supra note 303, at 415.
380. Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250,256 (7th Cir. 1986).
381. See generally Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV.
675. 732 (2007) (arguing that "[t]he shareholder franchise is largely a myth"). Target shareholders also
have the right to vote on mergers, but only after the board has endorsed the transaction. See, e.g.,
MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 11.04(6) (2008); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c) (2001).
382. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 107, at 210.
383. See Shareholder Vote on Executive Compensation Act, H.R. 1257, 110th Cong. (2007).
384. Thompson & Thomas, supra note 147, at 1790.
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Another potential solution would be to appoint an independent
specialist or specialists to make decisions in specified areas.385 An obvi-
ous issue is that the specialist will not have the same level of company-
specific information and expertise as the company's board, thus this solu-
tion appears inappropriate in contexts such as mergers and acquisi-
tions.386 It may, however, be possible to reduce this concern by ensuring
that the specialist has independent sources of information.387 The risk
that an independent expert might be co-opted also exists. Arguably
compensation consultants are an example of experts who have been co-
opted, given that they invariably recommend substantial pay packages
and provide cover for a board to approve them.3"
Some academics have supported this notion of an independent spe-
cialist for derivative suit litigation. An expert may well be capable of
judging the costs and benefits of the litigation. Seligman persuasively ar-
gues that a "disinterested person" should evaluate whether a lawsuit
should proceed.389 The advantages of this procedure may include "reduc-
tion of litigation costs, increased procedural fairness, and greater protec-
tion of shareholders. 390
C. Different Processes
Even absent a change in laws or decision makers, boards could still
improve their decision-making processes.391 Such changes would have
the added effect of improving the likelihood of a board's decision surviv-
385. Lynne Dallas has suggested creating a second board composed solely of independent direc-
tors that would perform conflicts monitoring. See Lynne L. Dallas, Proposals for Reform of Corporate
Boards of Directors: The Dual Board and Board Ombudsperson, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 91, 114
(2007); see also Millstein & MacAvoy, supra note 351, at 118 (arguing that an independent director
rather than the company's CEO should serve as chair of the board in order to develop independent
board leadership).
386. On the other hand, in some situations, an independent specialist might work well. For ex-
ample, in an internal investigation typically a board uses in-house counsel or hires an outside law firm.
As long as the company is not a client of the law firm that it hires, the risk of bias is reduced. There is,
of course, a high risk of a biased investigation if the company is a significant client. See, e.g., In re En-
ron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549, 668 n.103 (S.D. Tex. 2002). This ap-
proach is also reflected in the requirement that SLCs should hire their own legal and financial experts
rather than use the company's.
387. See Dallas, supra note 119, at 130-37 (proposing the establishment of an ombudsperson as a
source of information for independent decision makers); see also James D. Cox, Managing and Moni-
toring Conflicts of Interest: Empowering the Outside Directors with Independent Counsel, 48 VILL. L.
REV. 1077, 1082 (2003).
388. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Ex-
ecutive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 789-91 (2002) ("[M]anagers use compensation consult-
ants primarily to justify executive pay, rather than to optimize it.").
389. See Joel Seligman, The Disinterested Person: An Alternative Approach to Shareholder De-
rivative Litigation, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 357, 362-65 (1992).
390. Id. at 358.
391. See MacCoun, supra note 137, at 275 (listing several debiasing techniques but noting "that
none of these techniques provides 'silver bullet' solutions"); Thagard, supra note 92, at 378 (claiming
that in situations where conflicts of interest are unavoidable, several strategies "may combine to re-
duce the prevalence of immoral decisions deriving from conflicts of interest").
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ing attack under the business judgment rule or Unocal, because both de-
pend in part on the reasonableness of the investigation.3" Improvements
in process would also increase the perceived fairness of the results.393
First, boards and courts should recognize the potential impact and
presence of bias on the decision-making process.394 If people were aware
of decision-making research they might be less confident in their deci-
sions and might generate questions that could lead to better decisions.395
Admittedly, this approach in laboratory studies has had only limited suc-
cess,396 but it also has not been harmful.
Second, there are several decision-making strategies that may re-
duce the impact of unconscious bias. These approaches include dividing
the task into first an information search and then a decision section;3"
requiring decision makers to justify their information choices;3 98 appoint-
ing a director as "devil's advocate," thereby ensuring opposing argu-
ments are given at least somewhat more consideration;399 and deliber-
392. See, e.g., Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) (requiring that direc-
tors show "reasonable investigation"); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (requiring
that directors inform themselves "of all material information reasonably available to them").
393. See Kees van den Bos et al., When Do We Need Procedural Fairness? The Role of Trust in
Authority, 75 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1449,1449 (1998) (noting that "perceived procedural
fairness positively affects how people react to the outcomes they receive from authorities" and is "one
of the most frequently replicated findings" in social psychology).
394. See Tenbrunsel & Messick, supra note 288, at 226 (noting that "we need to acknowledge the
pervasiveness of self-deception and its role in unethical decision making"). Jerome Frank captured
this notion for judicial bias: "The conscientious judge will, as far as possible, make himself aware of his
biases.., and, by that very self-knowledge, nullify their effect.... [T]he sunlight of awareness has an
antiseptic effect on prejudices." Adam J. Hirsch, Cognitive Jurisprudence, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1331,
1369 (2003) (quoting In re J.P. Linahan, Inc., 138 F.2d 650, 652-53 (2d Cir. 1943) (Frank, J.)). Frank
was also aware of the risks: "[O]ne of the subtlest tendencies which a conscientious judge must learn to
overcome is that of 'leaning over backwards' in favor of persons against whom his prejudices incline
him.... [S]ome men ... have been unjust in their efforts to exclude bias .... " Id.
395. See Pronin & Kugler, supra note 136, at 576 (demonstrating that explaining the shortcomings
of introspection reduced participants' confidence in their objectivity); Thagard, supra note 92, at 367-
79. One problem is that the kind of process evidence presented here is not the best kind to persuade
decision makers to change. See Bazerman & Malhotra, supra note 343, at 274-76. Frequently decision
makers have the view that "credible empirical evidence consists of outcome data, not of mechanism
data." Id. at 274.
396. See, e.g., Pronin et al., supra note 14, at 378 (reporting studies that suggest "that knowledge
of particular biases in human judgment and inference, and the ability to recognize the impact of those
biases on others, neither prevents one from succumbing nor makes one aware of having done so");
Wilson & Brekke, supra note 300, at 130-33 (reporting that studies involving forewarning decision
makers of potential biases have yielded mixed results).
397. Norbert L. Kerr & R. Scott Tindale, Group Performance and Decision Making, 55 ANN.
REV. PSYCHOL. 623, 638 (2004).
398. Jonas et al., supra note 199, at 569 (claiming that a decision maker's focus will have been
shifted at least somewhat from the decision to the information search).
399. Janis recommended the devil's advocate approach in his influential book. IRVING K. JANIS,
GROUPTHINK 267-68 (1982). It has also been recommended by several scholars in the corporate con-
text. See, e.g., COLIN B. CARTER & JAY W. LORSCH, BACK TO THE DRAWING BOARD: DESIGNING
CORPORATE BOARDS FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 175 (2004)- Marleen A. O'Connor, The Enron Board:
The Perils of Groupthink, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1233, 1304-06 (2003); cf. James A. Fanto, Whistleblowing
and the Public Director: Countering Corporate Inner Circles, 83 OR. L. REV. 435, 443 (2004) (propos-
ing directors with an "oppositional" attitude).
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ately framing a decision problem in multiple ways.4" People are less
likely to simply conduct confirmatory searches for information when
they are led to consider the contrary proposition before the search.4"1
This positive effect occurs even when the decision makers' mindset has
been affected without their conscious awareness.4 2
Third, a commonly suggested approach to conflicts of interest is dis-
closure.4 3 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Congress's response to Enron and
other corporate scandals, includes sections requiring enhanced disclo-
sure.4 °4 Other countries have also adopted this response. 5  The theory
maintains that if directors disclosed their potential conflicts (notably here
a candid discussion of the nature and strength of the ties that a director
has with others), investors could evaluate a company's corporate govern-
ance and make decisions accordingly.4" If their investments later prove
unprofitable because of the conflicts, at least investors cannot claim that
they were not warned.4 7
400. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values and Frames, 39 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST
341,343 (1984).
401. Adam D. Galinsky & Gordon B. Moskowitz, Counterfactuals as Behavioral Primes: Priming
the Simulation Heuristic and Consideration of Alternatives, 36 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 384,
384 (2000); Charles G. Lord et al., Considering the Opposite: A Corrective Strategy for Social Judg-
ment, 47 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1231, 1234 (1984). The same appears to be true for
groups. Researchers found that subjects exposed as a group to counterfactual thoughts were more
likely to seek out disconfirming information. See Laura J. Kray & Adam D. Galinsky, The Debiasing
Effect of Counterfactual Mind-Sets: Increasing the Search for Disconfirmatory Information in Group
Decisions, 91 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 69, 70 (2003). Follow-up research found
that the positive effect of a counterfactual mindset on group decision making did not occur when only
individual members of the group had the counterfactual mind set; the mind set had to be at the indi-
vidual level. See Katie A. Liljenquist et al., Exploring the Rabbit Hole of Possibilities by Myself or with
My Group: The Benefits and Liabilities of Activating Counterfactual Mind-Sets for Information Sharing
and Group Coordination, 17 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 263,263 (2004).
402. See Galinsky & Moskowitz, supra note 401, at 384.
403. See generally CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN THE PROFESSIONS (Michael Davis & Andrew Stark
eds., 2001). Interestingly, the SEC in 1978 proposed that proxy statements should specify whether
outside directors were "independent" or "affiliated." See Shareholder Communications, Shareholder
Participation in the Corporate Electoral Process and Corporate Governance Generally, Exchange Act
Release No. 34-14,970, 15 SEC Docket 291 (July 18, 1978).
404. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, §§ 406(a), 407(a), 15 U.S.C. §§ 7264(a), 7265(a) (Supp. V 2005)
(requiring a company to disclose whether it has a code of ethics and a financial expert on its audit
committee rather than requiring these actions).
405. For example, in the United Kingdom, the Combined Code on Corporate Governance pro-
vides that boards should comply with guidelines requiring that directors are "independent in character
and judgement" or explain why they do not comply. The board must also disclose whether the direc-
tor had any "relationships... which are likely to affect, or could appear to affect, the director's judge-
ment." COMBINED CODE ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § A.3.1 (2008) (U.K.), available at
http://www.frc.irg.uk/corporate/combinedcode.cfm.
406. See generally In re Lear Corp. S'holder Litig., 926 A.2d 94, 98 (Del. Ch. 2007) (holding that
"stockholders are entitled to know that the CEO harbored material economic motivations that dif-
fered from their own"); Paul M. Healey & Krishna G. Palepu, Information Asymmetry, Corporate Dis-
closure, and the Capital Market: A Review of the Empirical Disclosure Literature, 31 J. ACCr. & ECON.
405,407-10 (2001).
407. See Daylian M. Cain et al., The Dirt on Coming Clean: Perverse Effects of Disclosing Con-
flicts of Interest, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 2-4 (2005) (discussing the perceived advantages of disclosure for
resolving conflict of interest problems).
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Research, however, shows at least three difficulties with this ap-
proach. The first problem is that investors do not necessarily know what
to do with the information.4 8 Second, there is a concern about directors'
responses to disclosure of their potential conflicts, referred to as "moral
licensing.""4 9  Disclosure might reduce feelings of guilt about decision
making in one's own or a friend's interest, thereby ultimately making
such a decision more likely. Third, disclosure ultimately has no impact
on the underlying problem of business decisions made on grounds other
than the underlying merits. "[Tlhere is no reason to believe that the act
of disclosing such interests would influence the unconscious processes of
decision making that allow personal biases to distort reasoning away
from professional responsibilities. '"41'
Overall, given the different circumstances in which unconscious bi-
ases are likely to operate, the optimal approach is likely a modest blend
of the above decision-making responses. Even though these biases are
likely to be pervasive, overall the U.S. system of corporate governance
has worked fairly well. In addition, all of the possible solutions evaluated
here impose both costs and benefits, and ex ante it is impossible to know
which would predominate. The advantage of the listed procedural
changes is that their costs would be relatively low and their benefits in
improved decision making could occasionally be very high.
VI. CONCLUSION
Corporate governance over the last thirty years has increasingly re-
lied on the independent director.4" ' More than twenty-five years ago the
Delaware Supreme Court raised "the ... question ... whether inquiry as
to independence, good faith and reasonable investigation is sufficient
safeguard against abuse, perhaps subconscious abuse."4"' Now, hundreds
of psychological studies later, the answer is clear: at least with respect to
subconscious abuse, the inquiry is inadequate. Ideally, truly independent
directors would always make decisions based solely on the corporate
merits, without concern for their self-interests or emotional attachments.
In situations involving conflicts of interest, however, psychological re-
408. See Antony Page, Taking Stock of the First Amendment's Application to Securities Regula-
tion, 58 S.C. L. REV. 789, 817-18 (2007) (discussing investors' difficulties with companies' disclosures).
409. Cain et al., supra note 407, at 7 (moral-licensing). Monin and Miller have used a similar
term, "self-licensing," to describe the phenomenon that people are more likely to express possibly
prejudicial attitudes if they have previously established their credentials as nonprejudiced. See Benoit
Monin & Dale T. Miller, Moral Credentials and the Expression of Prejudice, 81 J. PERSONALITY &
Soc. PSYCHOL. 33, 41-42 (2001); see also Joseph Nocera, Disclosure Won't Tame C.E.O. Pay, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 14. 2006, at B1 (arguing that disclosure may in fact increase executive compensation).
410. Thagard, supra note 92, at 374.
411. See Jonathan H. Gabriel, Misdirected? Potential Issues with Reliance on Independent Direc-
tors for Prevention of Corporate Fraud, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 641, 646-47 (2005); Gordon, supra
note 1, at 1471 (reporting that the "fraction of independent directors for large public firms has shifted
from approximately 20% in the 1950s to approximately 75% by the mid-2000s").
412. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 787 (Del. 1981).
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search demonstrates that this ideal is near impossible to achieve, even
when the decision maker is acting in good faith.
Whether or not we are aware of them, biases, in favor of oneself,
one's friends, and one's status, pervade many aspects of the decision-
making process. The impact on our decision making is virtually uncon-
trollable because it occurs outside of our conscious awareness. If the
goal is to make business decisions based solely on the merits and not on
extraneous considerations, we will frequently fall short. Fortunately,
most of a director's decisions do not involve conflicts between director
and shareholder interests. For the remainder-decisions involving com-
pensation, derivative suits, presuit demand, takeover offers, and internal
investigations-the issue is whether feasible responses might have
greater costs than benefits. The modest responses advocated here, in
particular with respect to improving decision-making processes, will
likely meet this standard.
